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Two essays comprise this doctoral dissertation on consumers and their charitable donations. 
The overall objective is to investigate the role of psychological distance in charitable 
donations, with each essay dealing with a different moderator of this relationship. 
 
In the first essay, I study the interactive effect of social distance and processing mode 
(affect vs. cognition).  Specifically, people tend to donate more if they use their emotions 
rather than cognition as diagnostic inputs for decision making, especially when donor and 
recipient are separated by greater social distance.  This may be because affect-driven and 
cognition-driven donors are influenced by different goals.  Affect-driven donors are mainly 
motivated by a consummatory goal of increasing their “warm glow” utility whereas 
cognition-driven donors are mainly motivated by an instrumental goal of increasing “public 
goods” utility (i.e., making a contribution that may benefit the donor as well).  While both 
consummatory and instrumental goals are relevant at closer social distance, only the 
consummatory goal is at work at greater social distance, which leads to a social distance by 
processing mode interaction.  The hypothesized effect is tested in a series of three 
experiments that use different contexts and dependent measures (e.g., donation of money vs. 
time). 
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In the second essay, I turn to the joint effect of psychological distance and dispositional 
empathy on charitable donation. Empathy or “Einfühlung” is defined as feeling one‟s way 
into the situation of another. While the literature suggests that empathy generally increases 
various forms of prosocial behavior including donations, I argue that this effect is contingent 
upon the psychological distance between donor and recipient.  The role of empathy is 
especially pronounced when the recipient is perceived to be psychologically closer to the 
donor.  This is because closer psychological distance leads to greater identification by the 
donor with the recipient, which in turn leads to greater donation.  I demonstrated support for 
the hypothesized interaction between dispositional empathy and psychological distance in 
three experiments, each addressing a different type of psychological distance. 
I conclude this dissertation with a discussion of the theoretical contribution and 
managerial importance of the findings. Managers of not-for-profits are confronted with a 
multitude of challenges in increasing donations while optimizing their resources. By pointing 
out the processes that underlie individual donors‟ decisions on charitable donations, this 
dissertation addresses a long-felt but rarely addressed lacuna in the literature. 
v 
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
 
“Charity begins at home, and justice begins next door.” 
- Tigg in Martin Chuzzlewit (Charles Dickens 1844/1994, 422) 
 
Charity is a subject of interest for multiple and diverse fields including Economics, 
Psychology and Marketing. Charitable donations may be thought of as involving the 
voluntary giving of resources to benefit another, without any seeming benefit to the person 
who is giving the resources. In this dissertation the person who is receiving the benefit of the 
resources, either directly or indirectly is referred to as the recipient whereas the person who is 
giving or donating the resources is referred to as the donor. Further, the resources given may 
take the form of money, time or other resources that are of benefit to the recipient and that are 
of value to the donor. For the purposes of this dissertation the focus is more on intended 
donations of money in response to situations that require such donations. However, in order 
to increase external validity, a context of donation of time is also employed. Theory drawn 
from the fields of Economics and Psychology will be discussed but the emphasis is on the 
discipline of Marketing.  
The focus in Marketing has mostly been on research on consumer behavior in order to 
increase profits for marketers. In contrast, the theme of this paper is on increasing donations 
from consumers to not-for-profit organizations. This is not very distant from much of the 
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literature in Marketing in that the same objective of increasing revenue lies at the crux of 
both. Indeed, the topic of increasing donations to not-for-profit organizations finds resonance 
in the call for transformative consumer research from senior members of the academy (Mick 
2006, 2008). 
Most of the work on charity comes from the discipline of Economics, possibly due to the 
puzzling aberrance of acts of charity. For the economist, charity has been intriguing because 
of the possibility that people act without regard to their own interests (Andreoni 2006). In 
other words, they act in a manner that does not maximize their utility. Instead of spending 
their limited resources on their own welfare, they choose to increase the welfare of another. 
This has led economists who study the topic to postulate two different explanations of why 
people perform acts of charity in separate streams of research (Vesterlund 2006). 
The first stream of research in economics assumes that people who perform acts of charity 
do so out of a concern for the provision of the charity‟s outputs. This viewpoint reflects the 
public goods aspect of donations to charity, where the donor receives some utility from 
consuming the public good that she has donated to. An example would be someone who 
contributes to public radio in the anticipation that she would listen to public radio herself. 
This stream of research may be less applicable to those charities that do not allow everyone to 
share in the benefits that arise from the charitable act. For instance, those who donate body 
parts do so to a particular person and may not derive public goods benefits from such a 
donation.  Similarly, those who contribute to feed starving children in a far-off country may 
not be doing so in the expectation that their own hunger for food will thus be satisfied. 
This has led some economists to hypothesize at the existence of another type of utility that 
may uniquely arise from donations to charity. In this stream of research it is assumed that by 
making donations to charity, the individual derives some singular form of utility from the 
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very act of charity and not from the output of the charity. One of the terms used to describe 
this type of utility is “warm-glow” although the term “feel-good” has also been used 
(Andreoni 1989, 1990, 2007). The benefit of this type of utility accrues only to the person 
who contributes to charity and not to anyone else who contributes or does not contribute. A 
context that comes closest to exemplifying the effects of such type of utility may be in the 
“pay all” format of some charity auctions wherein the highest bidder wins the good whereas 
all those who have bid on the good pay the amount that they have bid (Engers and McManus 
2007). The unsuccessful bidders would not win the good as their bid is not the highest but 
still would pay the amount of their bids, gaining more “warm-glow” utility for themselves. 
The winning bidder would gain both “warm-glow” utility as well as the utility that comes 
from acquisition of the good, but perhaps not “transaction utility” as suggested in Thaler‟s 
(1985) work.  
Assuming the existence of “warm-glow” utility allows for idiosyncratic behavior related to 
donations to charity since every person has a different utility function. In the literature that 
seeks to model “warm-glow” utility and allowing for the most general type of utility function, 
it is posited that each individual solves an optimization problem of:  
max Ui (xi, G, gi) 
by choosing appropriate values of xi, G, gi subject to the constraints  
xi + gi = wi  and  G-1+ gi = G 
where Ui is the utility that the i‟th individual attempts to maximize given that she has a 
certain wealth wi , which the individual allocates between private goods xi and donations to 
charity gi. The total amount that accrues to charity is G, with G-1 being the amount accruing 
to charity without the contribution from the i‟th individual. The amount donated gi enters the 
optimization problem twice; once as a private good (gi ) and once as part of the public good 
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(G-1+ gi = G) . This allows capture of two extremes of charitable behavior. When the 
individual is purely concerned with adequate provision of the public good and is indifferent 
to the utility from the private good gi, viz. the “warm-glow” utility she gains from making a 
charitable donation, the optimization problem becomes max Ui (xi, G). Such an individual 
may be termed purely altruistic. On the other hand an individual who can be called purely 
selfish is not concerned with adequate provision of the public good and maximizes her 
“warm-glow” utility. In effect she optimizes the function max Ui (xi, gi). Most individuals can 
be characterized as operating somewhere between these two extremes and thus can be 
referred to as being impurely altruistic (Andreoni 1990). Hence, there is a possibility that 
individuals who contribute to charity could be operating with a purely altruistic or purely 
selfish mindset. More likely, donors derive utility from a combination of the provision of the 
public good and the “warm-glow” utility resulting from their donations and hence may be 
termed impurely altruistic. Support for this comes from the field of neuroscience that 
indicates neural activity is consistent with both “warm-glow” utility and pure altruism 
(Harbaugh, Mayr and Burghart 2007). 
Considering “warm-glow” utility alone it is probable that an individual experiences it 
differently based on a host of individual factors, situational factors and a combination of 
individual and situational factors. The effects of some of these factors are detailed in the 
literature of psychology and marketing (Bendapudi, Singh and Bendapudi 1996). The terms 
“helping behavior” and “prosocial behavior” have been extensively used in the psychology 
literature, with the types of resources being donated by the donor including time, physical 
effort as well as money. Factors that influence individuals‟ decisions with respect to charity 
include guilt, social status, religiosity, kinship with the beneficiary of donation and types of 
donation, as well as such psychological constructs as cognitive capacity, affect and memory.  
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The effect of emotion per se was examined by Bagozzi and Moore (1994) who found 
better results when negative emotions were aroused, which they did by pictorial depictions of 
a victim of child abuse in an advertisement asking for donations to help victims of child 
abuse. Also noteworthy are the results of experimental research that has demonstrated that 
donations of time are related to the affect engendered by the cause to which the donation goes 
to as opposed to the lack of such a relationship for donations of money (Reed, Aquino and 
Levy 2007). Continuing in this vein of examining the differences between donations of time 
and money, the role of emotion in the context of charitable donations has also been pointed 
out by Liu and Aaker (2008). They found that asking people how much time they would like 
to donate, increased the amount of money they stated they would subsequently like to donate 
as opposed to the contrary effect of asking for money first and then asking for commitment of 
time. Their explanation for this effect is that a request for time activates an emotional 
mindset, which is more core to an individual as compared to the activation of a mindset that 
deals with value when money is asked for. 
Guilt is also related to affect or emotion. The effects of guilt have been examined in two 
forms. Hibbert et al (2007) suggest that intention to donate to charity following exposure to 
an advertisement depends on the level of guilt aroused on exposure to the advertisement. 
They point out that moderate levels of such guilt have been found to perform better than low 
or high levels of guilt. Basil, Ridgway and Basil (2008) posited another mechanism in which 
guilt could be aroused. Using a similar method of exposure to a stimulus, they suggested the 
empathy and the donor‟s perceived efficacy in being able to make a meaningful donation, 
mediates the arousal of anticipatory guilt. They distinguish between guilt and empathy which 
distinction has been pointed out in other research (Batson 1998). Anticipatory guilt is the 
guilt that could be experienced when a person assumes that she can act to make the situation 
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better and not doing so would make her feel guilty. Thus, the form of guilt differs between 
the two studies but common to the two studies is the role of guilt which is an emotional state 
(Lewis 1993). Hence there appears to be an effect of emotion or affect on charity as 
documented in a variety of studies. While affect can be manifested in the form of guilt or 
other constructs, underlying the decision to donate is affect. Affect is also distinct from other 
constructs that may be more oriented towards cognition such as empathy. 
Empathy is distinct from guilt and is conceptualized as a construct predisposing the 
arousal of guilt (Basil, Ridgway and Basil 2008). Empathy has long been of interest in 
research on charity. Empathy is defined for the purposes of this dissertation as “Einfühlung”, 
a German word roughly translated as “to feel one‟s way into”. In other words, “being 
cognitively aware of another person‟s internal states and/ or putting oneself in the place of 
another and experiencing his or her feelings” (Bagozzi and Moore 1994, 58). Empathy may 
be regarded as more cognitive than affective in nature although there are elements of both in 
its nature (Davis et al 1987). Bagozzi and Moore (1994) used a context of child-abuse and 
found that empathy partially mediated a decision to help. It is important to distinguish 
sympathy from empathy, as these terms have been sometimes used interchangeably and 
sometimes have been confused with each other. Escalas and Stern (2003) looked at the 
effects on attitudes towards a dramatic advertisement and found that sympathy played a 
mediating role on the effects of advertisement type and this mediating role for sympathy was 
in turn mediated by empathy. They identified the definition of sympathy in consumer 
research as “a person‟s awareness of the feelings of another but not absorption in the feelings 
themselves” whereas in the case of empathy it has been defined as “an emotional response 
that stems from another‟s emotional state or condition and that is congruent with the other‟s 
emotional state or situation” (Escalas and Stern 2003, 567). It appears that empathy has both 
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cognitive and affective dimensions with authors choosing to define the construct more in 
terms of the one at the expense of the other, depending on their purpose. However, since it 
necessitates the conscious assumption of the mental state of another as opposed to affect that 
is aroused in a relatively automatic manner, it would appear to need cognitive resources for 
activation.  
Empathy must also be treated with caution since it is a dispositional variable as well as a 
consequent variable amenable to manipulation – one which demonstrates the effects of 
manipulation of a stimulus. Empathy has been treated as a dispositional variable and 
measured (Argo, Zhu and Dahl 2008). In order to examine the role that empathy plays when 
there is an option of being able to escape a situation that indicates need, Stocks, Lishner and 
Decker (2008) manipulated empathy. They found that even when the option of escape 
existed, higher rates of helping were brought on by greater empathetic arousal. It is well-
known in psychology that some people empathize more than others and in consumer research 
that has measured the construct of empathy, it has been treated as being in response to a 
stimulus (Bagozzi and Moore 1994; Escalas and Stern 2003; Basil, Ridgway and Basil 2008). 
Since, there are differences in the values of the construct when it was measured in response to 
a single stimulus, it seems likely that participants differed in their capacity for empathy. In 
the literature, empathy can be a dispositional variable as well as a manipulated variable with 
the latter being crucial for establishing the causal role of empathy for charitable donations. 
To sum up, the motivation for charity has been theorized in Economics to be that of 
maximizing utility, with individual differences manifesting in the relative proportion of 
“warm-glow” utility attendant on the act of charity. An individual may also derive utility 
from contributing to a public good for which the individual acts as donor and recipient. The 
role of the individual as recipient arises by virtue of his consumption of the public good. 
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Various factors have been shown to enhance or retard the act of charity. It appears that affect 
is one such factor and appears to play a role in the act of charity in various forms such as guilt 
or just as feelings about donation. Another factor distinct from emotion is empathy or the 
experience by the donor of the feelings or situation experienced by the recipient. 
In the next section of this dissertation, I relate the motivation for charity of “warm-glow” 
utility to the emotions attendant on the act of charity. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE USE OF AFFECT VS. COGNITION AND  
THE ROLE OF SOCIAL DISTANCE AS MODERATOR  
 
“The emotions aren't always immediately subject to reason,  
but they are always immediately subject to action” 
- William James 
Intuitively, it would appear to be a truism that affect has a beneficial role to play in 
charity. That is, people who use their heart more would tend to be more willing to donate, 
would feel better about donating and most importantly would donate more compared to those 
who relied more on cognitive processes. However, I suggest that “social distance” or the 
perceived extent of removal in a social sense that exists between donor and recipient, 
moderates the effect of the relative use of cognition and affect. Specifically, while the greater 
role of affect would be apparent when the donor and recipient are separated by greater social 
distance, this dominant role of affect may be less apparent with a decrease in social distance. 
This effect may arise because of the differing importance that “warm-glow” utility has for 
donors when there are differing magnitudes of social distance separating them from 
recipients. However, before discussing the moderating role of social distance, relevant work 
on affect and cognition is briefly discussed. 
Affect and cognition can be thought of as two independent processes of information 
processing of the attributes of a target. Yet, these two processes co-exist in every person 
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affecting attitudes and behaviors. Most research in consumer behavior has focused on 
cognition leading to calls at the 2010 Society for Consumer Psychology conference for 
increased attention to affect. Earlier the two processes and their joint or separate effects on 
consumer choice were examined by Shiv and Fedorikhin in two papers (1999, 2002). In the 
first paper, the authors examined the interplay of affect and cognition. Using a choice 
between an option that elicited greater positive affect and lesser positive cognition and an 
option that was the opposite, the authors found a significant effect of availability of cognitive 
resources. In subsequent experiments, they examined the role of presenting the actual choices 
or an image of the choices as well as the dispositional variable of propensity to act 
impulsively. Underlying their results was their argument that there are two bases for the 
choices that their participants made. The first was an automatic affective route wherein 
participants would tend to choose the option that was more positive in affect but perceived as 
less desirable with cognition. The second cognitive route, which could override the first 
affective route, was hypothesized as leading to an increased choice of the second option – the 
one which was less positive in affect but elicited more positive cognition. In order to reveal 
these hypothesized effects the authors manipulated cognitive load for some of their 
participants. Using a scale with scale items selected from published papers, the authors 
constructed a “decision basis” scale with an acceptable reliability statistic (α = 0.91). The 
authors did find the same effects in their two experiments providing support to their notion 
that there was an interplay of affect and cognition in consumer choice (Shiv and Fedorikhin 
1999).  In their next paper, they sought to demonstrate that the interplay of affect and 
cognition could result in higher order affect. The two processes related to affect and cognition 
take place in different areas of the brain and hence it is possible for cognition to exist 
independent of affect. In their model of affective and cognitive processes, the authors 
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proposed that given sufficient cognitive resources, it was possible for consumer choice to be 
driven by higher-order affect with cognition and affective reactions to the same two choices. 
In the series of experiments reported in their paper, they sought to manipulate the availability 
of cognitive resources, first through the mechanism of varying cognitive load as was done in 
the first paper and second through varying the amount of time available for cognition. They 
used the same “decision basis” scale as in their first paper with an acceptable reliability 
statistic (α = 0.88) as a measure of the utilization of affect versus cognition. The authors 
reported support for their premise that participants may make a choice based on cognition as 
well as their affective reactions (Shiv and Fedorikhin 2002). 
That affect may be used as a basis for decisions is echoed in research that indicates the use 
of what is known as the “How-do-I-feel-about-it” or HDIF heuristic. Schwarz and Clore 
(1983) documented the phenomenon that people may use momentary affective states induced 
experimentally as an indicator when making their judgments of happiness and their 
satisfaction with their lives. Much research done on affect has been in the same paradigm of 
inducing positive or negative affect and then documenting its effects on attitudes, decisions, 
self-esteem, etc. In the experiment by Schwarz and Clore, participants were induced to feel 
sad or happy by recollection of a suitable episode from their lives. Some participants were led 
to believe that a specially constructed room in which they were placed induced happiness or 
sadness in its occupants. This attenuated the effect of recollection of an unhappy episode on 
participants‟ reported happiness and satisfaction. It was found that participants who were 
afforded the opportunity to misattribute the negative affect that was induced, to the situation 
of being in a room that purportedly led to negative affect, did not demonstrate the reduced 
levels of happiness and satisfaction evinced by other participants. It appeared that participants 
reported their level of affect after discounting the information value of their existing affect if 
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they were able to misattribute it to the situation and hence perceived it as not relevant to their 
stable state of happiness or satisfaction with their lives. Pham (1998) continued in this vein of 
research by showing that it was not only the relevance of affect that participants considered 
but also how representative the feelings were of the task they were considering undertaking. 
Using a similar manipulation as that of Schwarz and Clore (1983) he had his participants 
report an episode in their lives that engendered positive or negative affect. Another factor that 
he manipulated was whether participants had a consummatory or instrumental motive 
(Holbrook and Hirschman 1982).  
Consummatory motives drive consumption behavior that is intrinsically rewarding such as 
seeing a movie for the pleasure of doing so. Instrumental motives are activated for behavior 
that is undertaken in pursuit of a goal such as seeing a movie as a pre-requisite for another 
objective. After priming consummatory or instrumental motives, Pham (1998) asked his 
participants to report their likelihood of seeing a movie. He found an effect of 
representativeness of the induced affect. The likelihood of seeing a movie depended not only 
on the perceived relevance of the induced affect as previously documented but also on its 
perceived representativeness. It must be noted that the affect induced and mistakenly 
transferred to the task (of seeing a movie) was thus integral to the task and not an artifact of 
having to make a decision about the task (about seeing a movie) or incidental to the task such 
as when it is related to the situation (Cohen, Pham and Andrade 2008). This stream of 
research seems to indicate that people conjure up a representation of the situation in which 
they undertake the task they are confronted with and then examine their feelings in that 
imagined situation (Greifeneder, Bless and Pham 2010). This seems to be the higher-order 
affect that Shiv and Fedorikhin (2002) also refer to in their paper and forms the content on 
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which the HDIF heuristic is based. Participants consider their affect related to the tasks which 
they are confronted with and then use that affect as an input to their decisions.  
Making the connection to charitable donation, it could be expected that donors consider 
how they would feel about making (or not making) a donation and use that affect as an input 
for their decision on whether to donate and how much to donate. This kind of anticipatory 
affect manifested in the anticipation of guilt, has been shown to have an effect on donation 
behavior. 
Anticipatory guilt in giving behavior was shown to be a factor  in charitable donations by 
Basil, Ridgway and Basil (2008). In their research, they found that participants considered the 
level of guilt they would experience as a result of not acting to help someone in need. Earlier, 
Hibbert el al (2007) showed that actual guilt aroused on exposure to communications affected 
donations made. As was shown by Schwarz and Clore (1983) negative emotions arouse 
participants to address the situation to a greater extent than positive emotions, possibly 
because people desire and expect to be in a state of positive affect. Hence the guilt or 
anticipated guilt aroused when people are called upon to consider making a donation would 
be a factor that needs to be addressed in the context of charitable donations.  
Thus, the intuition discussed at the beginning of this section, that affect plays a role in 
charitable donations has theoretical justification. In a chapter speculating on the origins of 
sympathy for helping behavior, Loewenstein and Small (2007) related a dual process model 
of what they called sympathy and deliberation on helping behavior. In their view, sympathy 
is “caring but immature and irrational” whereas deliberation is “rational but uncaring”. They 
suggest that this dual process explains why there were greater donations to help “Baby 
Jessica”, a 18 month old child who fell into a well in Texas compared to the 16% of children 
in the USA who are living in poverty (Loewenstein and Small 2007, 118).   Work in the area 
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of charitable donations by Basil, Ridgway and Basil (2008) who documented the role of 
anticipatory guilt, the role of experienced guilt found by Hibbert et al (2007) and the review 
of work on charity by Bendapudi, Singh and Bendapudi (1996) establish the role of affect. 
The precise nature of this role vis-à-vis that of cognition has been demonstrated in papers by 
Shiv and Fedorikhin (1999, 2002) with the use of affect as an informational input for 
decisions suggested by the work of Pham (1998).  
 
H1: Donors who rely more on affect as opposed to cognition will show greater propensity to 
donate. 
 
In order to establish the antecedents of the role of affect in decision making on charity, the 
motivations for charity must be examined, viz. the motivation of increasing “warm-glow” 
utility. 
Warm-Glow vs. Cold Reason 
 
Andreoni (1989, 1990) suggested that donors experienced a form of utility derived from 
making donations. This addressed the lacuna in theory from Economics that didn‟t take into 
account the motivation of donors who gave away money or other resources such as time. It 
seems paradoxical that people could derive utility from giving their resources and not usually 
receiving something tangible in return. In Andreoni‟s conception of impure altruism, the 
donor gains utility from the provision of the public good that she makes a donation to as well 
as the “warm glow” utility that comes from making a donation. At one extreme are the 
donations made solely for the benefit that comes from the act of making a donation or the 
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“warm glow”. It is readily apparent that the donor in this case is indifferent to the identity or 
other individual characteristics of the victim in whose benefit the donation is put to use. 
Instead the donor is concerned with her own benefit that comes from the “warm glow” utility 
attendant with making a donation.  
A parallel could be drawn to the distinction between instrumental and consummatory 
motives for consumption (Holbrook and Hirschman 1982). As stated previously, 
consummatory motives drive consumption behavior that is intrinsically rewarding such as 
seeing a movie for the pleasure of doing so. Instrumental motives are activated for behavior 
that is undertaken in pursuit of a goal such as seeing a movie as a pre-requisite for another 
objective. A consummatory motive for making a donation would be indicated by a concern 
for the intrinsic reward that comes from the act of making a donation and not to the 
specificities of the donation. In other words, someone who is concerned solely with the 
“warm-glow” utility would be acting with a consummatory as opposed to an instrumental 
motive. As pointed out by Pham (1998) people with a consummatory motive are more likely 
to be influenced by affect. Since the donor is influenced by the “warm glow” utility or benefit 
that comes from making a donation, it could be predicted that any social distance that exists 
between donor and victim, would not be an overriding factor in decisions about donation. 
Regardless of the social distance that exists between donor and recipient, a donor would gain 
“warm-glow” utility from the very act of charity and would be acting from a consummatory 
motive. Hence, a donor motivated by “warm-glow” utility would pay more heed to the affect 
associated with the act of charity as affect would be more of an influence as described by 
Pham (1998). The quantum of social distance between donor and recipient may not play a 
role since the donor is focused on the act of charity rather than the recipient. 
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At the other extreme are the situations where the donor makes a donation without regard to 
the “warm glow” utility that comes from making the donation. In this case donors maximize a 
utility function that includes the precise amount needed for provision of the public good at 
the level that she considers optimum. It must be remembered that the optimization function 
concerns the allocation of her wealth between the public good of charity and the basket of 
private goods which confer utility as a result of their acquisition. Regarding the public good 
in isolation, the donor is concerned with her own direct or indirect consumption of it. An 
example could be donations to support broadcasting networks that provide entertainment to 
donors and other viewers alike (Fisher, Vandenbosch and Antia 2008). The donor motivation 
to make a donation is that the public good to which she donates, directly or indirectly benefits 
her. The donor is less concerned with the act of donation and the consequent “warm-glow” 
utility. The donor in this situation is likely to have instrumental motives (Holbrook and 
Hirschman 1982). In other words the donation isn‟t intrinsically rewarding but is meant to 
assist in the pursuit of the goal of optimum provision of the public good. In such a situation, it 
is likely that the donor may be driven to a lesser extent by affect and pays more heed to her 
cognition.  
It is logical that public goods that are more likely to be closer rather than farther would 
serve the donor better, as she is unlikely to derive utility from consumption of something that 
is farther away. Even if the donation is meant to help another person it is more likely that the 
donor will gain a benefit if the victim is part of her own society or is at a lesser social 
distance. Insights from evolutionary psychology suggest that a donor would prefer to 
contribute to the survival of related rather than unrelated genomes. For instance, a study of 
identical twins referred to as monozygotic, compared to fraternal twins referred to as 
dizygotic, indicates that the former exhibited greater helping behavior to each other than the 
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latter (Segal 1984). If an instrumental motive is indeed what motivates the donor, then it is 
likely that affect has less importance and instead the donor will more likely to be swayed by 
cognition about how her donation may benefit her. This cognition resulting from an 
instrumental motive will favor donation to a recipient at closer rather than farther social 
distance. In contrast, a person motivated by a consummatory motive will be more moved by 
the affect attendant on donation and will tend to donate more.  
Since most people are unlikely to be solely motivated by either “warm-glow” utility or the 
utility from donating to public goods, it is expected that people will show the effects of 
impure altruism. The differences will be most apparent when the social distance existing 
between donor and recipient is greater, showing the differences in donation between people 
who use their “heart” or affect more as opposed to their “head” or effortful cognitive 
processes. At this point, it would seem to be in order to suggest a more formal definition of 
“social distance” along with the literature that appears to address this construct in the context 
of charity. 
More often than not, donors in a society like that in the USA will contribute more to help 
victims in their own society. The donation tends to be less in the case of victims in a different 
society, even if the need for a donation is more. There are of course, many differences 
between the peoples of other societies and the society in the USA. The first difference that 
rises to mind is the actual geographical distance between the USA and those societies. 
Undeniably, geographical distance is very often confounded with societal differences. I seek 
to examine the effect of societal differences, which is termed social distance (Liberman, 
Trope and Stephan 2007) by disentangling it from geographical distance. The effect of 
societal or more generally, social distance may be crucial for charitable fundraising. Very 
often, the only difference between a comparatively wealthy donor and a needy recipient is 
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that of social distance. In the USA, social class may be conflated with wealth indicating that 
charitable donations involving the transfer of money are not just a monetary transaction but 
also a transaction between social classes that are differentiated by social distance. 
There has been work that has examined the role of social distance on prosocial behavior. 
Recently, Winterich, Mittal and Ross (2009) examined the role of perception of in-group 
versus out-groups on donation behavior, using undergraduate samples in the USA. In their 
first two experiments they examined the differences in donation behavior towards victims in 
the USA (Hurricane Katrina) or in Indonesia (Indian Ocean tsunami). They found significant 
effects of the location of the victims but not in their third experiment where they used a 
scenario related to aiding bombing victims in London, UK or in Iraq, based on the notion that 
undergraduates in the USA would identify more with victims in London. Their hypotheses 
examined the role of gender identity and the extent to which their participants‟ reported 
individual  differences in the inclusion of  others in their self-concept, as moderators of the 
simple effects of differences in donation behavior towards in-groups and out-groups. It could 
be contended that their in-groups and out-groups differed in terms of geography as well as the 
societies they were part of. This is in fact a recurring problem with the removal of the victim 
from the donor in a geographical sense being confounded by a simultaneous separation of 
victim and donor in a social sense. Grau and Folse (2007) used a manipulation that involved 
contribution to a national or a local cause – it is immediately apparent that the former 
subsumes the latter. Research that holds promise of considering social distance in isolation 
was the experiment designed by Kogut and Ritov (2007). The authors used samples drawn 
from the Israeli undergraduate population. Two days after the Indian Ocean tsunami, they 
asked students to donate to save either Indian tourists or Israeli tourists, with a common 
location of having been vacationing on the same Indian Ocean island. In this manner the 
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researchers were able to maintain the same geographical distance for the victims, while 
presenting differences related to social distance. The victims were all at the same 
geographical distance as they were lost on the same Indian Ocean island, with the only 
difference between them being whether they were members of an in-group (Israeli) or out-
group (Indian) for Israeli undergraduates. The experimental scenarios used in this dissertation 
are similar to those reported in the paper by Kogut and Ritov (2007). In the scenarios 
presented to participants, the victims differ only in social distance but not in terms of the 
geography that they happen to be in. In other words, the recipients cannot be differentiated by 
their being geographically farther or closer in relation to the donors. The stimuli reported in 
this study are similarly designed to offer participants little differentiating information save 
that of differences in social distance that exist between participants (donors) and recipients. 
The differences in consequent attitudes towards donation and donation intentions are then 
hypothesized to arise due to the moderating role of social distance on the relative use of affect 
and/ or cognition on the part of participants. 
 
H2: The beneficial effect of greater reliance on affect rather than cognition will be 
exacerbated when the donor and recipient are separated by greater social distance and 
attenuated when the donor and recipient are separated by lesser social distance. An 
interaction will exist between the measure of relative use of affect and cognition and social 
distance.   
 
The question arises as to whether the processes of cognition and affect may act 
simultaneously; in equal and full measure. Shiv and Fedorikhin (2002) do not propose such a 
path in their model. Even if such a process did exist it would be unlikely that participants 
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would be able to indicate its effects as any awareness of their affect (emotions) would 
inevitably be a result of cognition based on the HDIF heuristic (Schwarz and Clore 1983).  
The above hypotheses were put to test in a series of experiments with the assistance of 
undergraduate participants. The description and results of those experiments are detailed in 
the next section. In order to build on existing literature, the scenarios and measures are based 
on documented effects in the literature. 
Study 1 
 
The first study was conducted to establish the moderating effect of social distance on the 
predominant use of either affect or cognition on participants‟ proposed amounts of donation. 
The stimuli were based on that used by Kogut and Ritov (2007) with appropriate changes. 
Instead of Indian or Israeli tourists missing after the tsunami on an island in the Indian Ocean, 
the scenario outlined missing Indian or American tourists. Participants were asked how much 
they would donate to a search for the missing tourists if they were compensated $10 for 
participation in the study. The moderating effect of greater reliance of either affect or 
cognition was assessed using the five-item scale from Shiv and Fedorikhin (2002). 
Participants. A sample of 60 undergraduate students enrolled in Marketing classes at a 
major public university in the Southeast of the United States participated in the study. 56% of 
the sample was female and their average age was 21.86 years (SD = 1.83, range = 19 – 27). 
These demographic characteristics did not have any significant effect on the dependant 
variable and are not discussed further.   
Design and Procedure. The sample participants were assigned at random to one of two 
cells, with the target of donation varying in social distance being the between-subjects factor 
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(Indian tourists or American tourists missing on an Indian Ocean island). Participants were 
invited to take part in the study in return for extra course credit. They were informed that 
there was an alternative means of earning the same quantum of extra course credit if they did 
not want to participate in the study. After reading an informed consent document, participants 
completed the questionnaire at their own pace. Following completion of the questionnaire, 
participants submitted their questionnaires revealing neither any identifying information nor 
any means of linking the quantum of extra course credit to their responses in the 
questionnaire. This procedure and associated instruments were approved by a university-level 
Institutional Review Board. 
Measures 
Relative Use of Affect vs. Cognition. The predominant use of affect or cognition in arriving 
at an amount to donate was assessed using a scale based on the five-item scale used in Shiv 
and Fedorikhin (2002, 353). The statement above the scale asked participants what drives 
their final decisions on donations followed by five seven-point semantic differential scales. 
The opposite anchors for the five scales were: “My feelings” – “My thoughts”, “My desire” – 
“My willpower”, “My prudent self” – “My impulsive self” (reverse coded), “The rational 
side of me” – “The emotional side of me” (reverse coded) and “My heart” – “My head”. The 
reliability of these five items was assessed so as to enable the formation of a single measure. 
However a low value of the reliability coefficient (α = .66) necessitated the removal of the 
fourth item. The resulting reliability coefficient was satisfactory (α = .79) which enabled the 
average of the four items (M = 3.16, SD = 1.39) to be calculated so as to form a single 
measure of the relative use of affect or cognition in arriving at the dependant variable. The 
dependant variable was the numerical answer to the question, “If you were given $10 as 
payment for participating in this research, how much would you have contributed…”  
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Results 
Sixty undergraduate participants completed the questionnaire. However, ten of the 
responses were considered unusable owing to the participants indicating that they would 
contribute more than $10. Previous work in charitable giving has relied on endowing 
participants with a sum of money and asking participants to return a part of that sum as their 
contribution towards the charity of interest. For example, Winterich, Mittal and Ross (2009) 
presented their participants with five one dollar bills and used the number of dollar bills 
placed by participants in an envelope that was marked for contribution, as their dependant 
variable. Research in the domain of charitable donations attempts to control for individual 
levels of wealth on the part of the participants. In order to achieve this neutralization of 
individual levels of wealth, researchers usually endow their participants with a certain 
amount of money and treat the amount returned as the participants‟ contribution to charity. In 
lieu of the availability of resources to endow my participants with money to donate, I use a 
hypothetical donation and remove those whose donations exceed the hypothetical endowment 
of $10. The data from the resulting sample of 50 participants was used to test my hypothesis.  
My hypothesis was that differences in donation amount elicited by variation in social 
distance would be affected by the differential use of affect or cognition. In order to reveal any 
significant differences, the variation in social distance was contrast coded (1 for American 
tourists and -1 for Indian tourists). This contrast code was multiplied by the score on the 
measure of relative use of affect or cognition to yield the interaction term. The dependant 
variable of amount out of $10 that the participant would have contributed was regressed (R
2
 = 
0.16) on the contrast code for social distance (t = -2.19, p = .033, partial η
2
 = 0.097) revealing 
a significant simple main effect. Similarly a significant simple main effect of the relative 
measure of use of affect or cognition (t = -2.09, p = .042, partial η
2
 = 0.088) was evident. As 
23 
hypothesized the interaction of the two (t = 1.94, p = .06, partial η
2
 = 0.077) showed as an 
effect. This indicated marginal support for the hypothesis of interaction – the increased 
reliance on affect as opposed to cognition appeared to be moderated by the effects of social 
distance. 
In order to facilitate interpretation, the sample was split with respect to their responses to 
the measure of use of affect versus cognition with the median serving as the point at which 
the sample was divided. The figure below is presented below only for purposes of 
interpretation. The same procedure is followed for all figures that are provided to illustrate 
the empirical results. Please refer to Figure 10 for a schematic illustrating the procedure 
followed for all figures in this dissertation. 
Essay 1 - Study 1 
DV = Hypothetical Donation
Social distance t (1, 45) = -2.19, p = 0.033
Affect vs. cognition t (1, 45) = -2.09, p = 0.042 (H1)
Interaction t (1, 45) =  1.94, p = 0.06 (H2)
n.s. p = 0.006
 
Figure 1 Interaction of Social Distance with Affect vs. Cognition 
for dependant variable of hypothetical donation in first experiment of first essay 
 
The results indicate that the individual difference in the use of affect vs. cognition is more 
pronounced in its effect on donations when recipients are farther off socially from the donor. 
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There appears to be little difference in donation when the recipient is closer in terms of social 
distance, regardless of individual differences in mode of processing. To compare whether the 
differences in donation was actually significant, a regression analysis was used to find the 
effect of the relative measure of use of affect or cognition on the hypothetical donation. When 
the condition for closer social distance was blocked there was no effect of the relative use of 
affect vs. cognition. However, when the condition for greater social distance was analyzed 
separately, the relative use of affect vs. cognition was significant in predicting the amount of 
the hypothetical donation (t = - 3, p = 0.006). 
Discussion 
My first study indicates that there is some support for the hypothesis that there is a 
moderating effect of social distance on participants‟ use of predominantly affect or cognition 
in their processing of decisions as to how much to donate to recipients. It must be reiterated 
that any manipulation of social distance may also inadvertently result in differences in 
perceived geographical distance. I used established stimuli that resulted in differences in 
social distance, while maintaining geographical distance as constant. The authors who 
developed those stimuli were interested in the differences in donation to in-groups compared 
to out-groups (Kogut and Ritov 2007). The difference between in-groups and out-groups can 
be likened to social distance. The ingenuity of the stimuli lies in the manipulation of social 
distance while holding geographical distance unchanged – both the Israeli tourists (American 
in my study) and Indian tourists were feared lost on the same Indian Ocean island following 
the tsunami. 
The marginal significance of the interaction term is a cause for some concern. Perhaps this 
was due to the loss of data resulting from exclusion of those participants who had stated their 
intent to donate more than the hypothetical endowment of $10. The consequent loss of power 
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may have led to findings of marginal significance. It must also be noted that the insufficient 
reliability coefficient (α = 0.66) for a scale that demonstrated adequate reliability (α = 0.88) 
in the study reported by its authors (Shiv and Fedorikhin 2002), also served as impetus for 
replicating the first study with enhanced power. Thus, Study 2 did not differ greatly from 
Study 1 except as reported below. 
Study 2 
 
The second study was conducted to address the identified shortcomings of the first study, 
namely (i) the possible lack of sufficient power to yield results that were significant at the 
conventional 95% confidence level and (ii) the low level of reliability seen in the five-item 
scale that served as the measure of the variables capturing the relative use of affect or 
cognition. The stimuli were identical to that of the previous study. Participants were asked for 
their likelihood of donating and how much they would donate to a search for the missing 
tourists if they were compensated $10 for participation in the study. It was emphasized to 
participants that their donation should be out of the $10 hypothetical compensation for 
participation in the study. The only other change was to the nationality of missing tourists in 
the condition of greater social distance – from Indian to Russian. Using Indian tourists in the 
scenario may elicit thoughts of tourists coming from a country with fewer resources to mount 
a rescue operation. Taking into account this possible complication, it was decided to replace 
India with Russia as the latter is more similar to the United States in terms of size and 
resources. 
Participants. A sample of 98 undergraduate students enrolled in Marketing classes at a 
major public university in the Southeast of the United States participated in the study. 54% of 
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the sample was female and their average age was 22.08 years (SD = 5.44, range = 18 – 55). 
These demographic characteristics did not have any significant effect on the dependant 
variables and are not discussed further.   
Design and Procedure. The sample participants were assigned at random to one of two 
cells, with the target of donation varying in social distance being the between-subjects factor 
(Russian tourists or American tourists missing on an Indian Ocean island). The procedure 
followed was identical to the first study. However, participants were handed a set of 
questionnaires for different studies including the questionnaire for this study. None of the 
other studies were relevant or could affect responses to the questionnaire for this study. The 
procedure and associated instruments were approved by a university-level Institutional 
Review Board. 
Measures 
Relative Use of Affect vs. Cognition. The predominant use of affect or cognition in arriving 
at an amount to donate was assessed using the same five-item scale as before  (Shiv and 
Fedorikhin 2002). The scale asked participants what drives their final decisions on donations 
followed by five seven-point semantic differential scales. The reliability of these five items 
was assessed so as to enable the formation of a single measure. The resulting reliability 
coefficient was satisfactory (α = 0.83) which enabled the average of the five items (M = 3.16, 
SD = 1.39) to be calculated so as to form a single measure of the relative use of affect or 
cognition in arriving at the dependant variable. The first dependant variable was the answer 
to the question, “How likely is it that you would have contributed to the effort by the rescue 
team…” with the response elicited on a seven-point scale anchored by Very Unlikely and 
Very Likely. The second dependant variable was the numerical answer to the question, “If 
you were given $10 as payment for participating in this research, how much would you have 
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contributed…” In the case of the second dependant variable, emphasis was placed on 
instructions that the maximum amount that could be hypothetically donated was $10. 
Manipulation Checks. Since the stimuli was changed from that used by Kogut and Ritov 
(2007) it was thought necessary to incorporate a manipulation check. The manipulation check 
was participants‟ reaction to the statement “The person who needs help in the scenario is part 
of a different social circle.” Participants indicated their agreement with this statement using a 
seven-point semantic differential scale anchored by “Strongly disagree” and “Strongly 
agree”. Analysis indicated a significant difference between the two groups (t (96) = 3.13, p 
(one-tailed) = 0.001) with participants in the group considering Russian victims indicating 
greater agreement (M = 5.12) than participants in the group considering American victims  
(M = 4).   
Results 
The data from two undergraduate participants were excluded as they did not provide 
responses to all the relevant questions, leaving data from 96 participants available for 
analysis. My hypothesis was that differences in social distance would moderate differences in 
the relative use of affect or cognition. In order to reveal any significant differences, the 
variation in social distance was contrast coded (1 for American tourists and -1 for Russian 
tourists). This contrast code was multiplied by the score on the measure of relative use of 
affect or cognition to yield the interaction term and three variables were used for regression 
(R
2
 = 0.09). The simple main effect of social distance did not have significant effects on the 
dependant variable of likelihood that the participant would have contributed. However there 
was a significant simple main effect of the measure of relative use of affect or cognition (t = -
2.7, p = .008, partial η
2
 = 0.073) on this dependant variable. Of most interest was the 
marginal significance of the interaction of the two (t = 1.77, p = .08, partial η
2
 = 0.033) on the 
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dependant variable of likelihood of the participant donating. This indicated marginal support 
for the hypothesis of interaction – the increased reliance on affect as opposed to cognition 
appeared to be moderated by the effects of social distance.  
Essay 1 - Study 2
DV = Likelihood of Donation
Social distance t (1, 93) = -1.23, p = 0.224
Affect vs. cognition t (1, 93) = -2.7,   p = 0.008 (H1)
Interaction t (1, 93) =  1.77, p = 0.08 (H2)
n.s. p = 0.006
 
Figure 2 Interaction of Social Distance with Affect vs. Cognition 
for dependant variable of likelihood of donation in second experiment of first essay 
 
The results indicate that it benefits recipients at greater social distance when participants 
lean towards affect more than cognition in making their decisions on donation; increasing the 
likelihood of their making a donation. When the social distance between the donation target 
and donor is decreased, the differences in likelihood between participants differing on the 
affect vs. cognition dimension are considerably attenuated. In order to reveal the exact nature 
of the interaction, regression analyses were employed as planned comparisons. Within the 
condition of lesser social distance (American beneficiaries) there was no effect when the 
likelihood of donation was regressed on the relative measure of use of affect vs. cognition. 
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However, there was an effect that was significant (t = - 2.86, p = 0.006) in the condition of 
greater social distance (Russian beneficiaries). 
The same procedure was followed for the second dependant variable of the hypothetical 
amount out of $10 that the participant would have contributed. In the regression model (R
2
 = 
0.13), the simple main effect of social distance was not significant but the measure of relative 
use of affect or cognition achieved significance (t = -2.17, p = .032, partial η
2
 = 0.048). Of 
especial interest was the significance of the term capturing the interaction of the two (t = 
2.22, p = .03, partial η
2
 = 0.05). This indicated support for the hypothesis of interaction – the 
increased reliance on affect as opposed to cognition was moderated by the effects of social 
distance for intent to make a donation from the $10 compensation. 
Essay 1 - Study 2
DV = Hypothetical Donation
Social distance t (1, 93) = -1.1,   p = 0.275
Affect vs. cognition t (1, 93) = -2.17, p = 0.032 (H1)
Interaction t (1, 93) =  2.22, p = 0.03 (H2)
n.s. p = 0.005 
 
Figure 3 Interaction of Social Distance with Affect vs. Cognition 
for dependant variable of hypothetical donation in second experiment of first essay 
 
The results indicate that when the donation target is farther off socially from the donor, 
those who demonstrate increased reliance on affect for making the decision to donate tend to 
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make higher donations. When the social distance between the donation target and donor is 
decreased, there appears to be a smaller difference in donation regardless of whether the 
donor is driven by affect or cognition. To check the genesis of the interaction, two regression 
analyses were run. In the condition of lesser social distance (American beneficiaries) there 
was no significant result of regressing the hypothetical donation out of $10 on the relative 
measure of use of affect vs. cognition. However in the condition of greater social distance 
(Russian beneficiaries) the relative measure of the use of affect vs. cognition was significant 
(t = -2.95, p = 0.005) in predicting the hypothetical donation. 
Discussion  
The second study replicates the results of the first study indicating support for the 
hypothesis that there is a moderating effect of social distance on participants‟ use of 
predominantly affect or cognition in their processing of decisions as to how much to donate 
to recipients.  However, in this study a significant effect of the interaction term was revealed 
in contrast to the marginal significance in the previous study. These effects were seen in the 
dependant variable of the hypothetical donation made from $10 that participants imagined 
receiving as compensation for participation in the study. Further, I did not have to exclude the 
data from any participant due to their stated intention to contribute more than $10. It can thus 
be ruled out  that there was any effects of participants‟ differing wealth on their quanta of 
donation. 
The marginal significance of the interaction term in the regression using the dependant 
variable of likelihood of donation indicates that the stimuli did not have as much 
verisimilitude as I would have liked. Unlike Kogut and Ritov (2007) who conducted their 
study (i) within days of the Indian Ocean tsunami, (ii) with one group of lost tourists who 
would have been seen as part of the Israeli students‟ in-group (Israeli tourists) and (iii) with 
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actual donations; my study asked students to consider a retrospective situation and imagine 
the opportunity to make a donation to help a group of tourists who while of the same 
nationality as the students, might have been seen as part of a different demographic. The next 
study attempts to neutralize the effects of these factors by asking student participants to 
consider making a real donation to help fellow students whose need was current. Further, it 
mimics the usual operationalization of donation wherein participants are endowed with a sum 
of money and then providing them with the opportunity to contribute a part or all of it while 
retaining the balance (if any) for themselves. 
Study 3 
 
The third study was undertaken to buttress the argument for reliability of the effects found 
in the previous two studies. The scenario was designed to be more relevant, more timely and 
involve actual donations rather than intent to donate. The students in the large Marketing 
section at the public research university in the Southeast United States at which the research 
was conducted, receive ten points (on a 1,000 point scale) for participation in research. These 
are the extra course credit points which about half of the eligible students (in a section of 
1,500 students) receive by virtue of their participation as subjects in experimental research. 
Participants were asked how many of the ten extra credit points they would be willing to 
donate to a fellow student who could not participate in the research due to illness or 
conflicting work schedule. As a manipulation of social distance, students were told either that 
the needy student was a marketing major or a nursing major. The notion that a marketing 
major would be socially distant from a student majoring in nursing seemed to have face 
validity, especially when compared to the diminished social distance that a student in an 
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introductory marketing class would have from a fellow student majoring in marketing. 
Participants could donate between zero and ten extra credit points to help the needy fellow 
student. After completing the questionnaire, participants were debriefed and reassured that 
they would receive their ten points regardless of whether they had chosen to donate or how 
many points they had chosen to donate. There was no effect of social pressure as participants 
had returned their questionnaires before debriefing. Further, there was no identifying 
information elicited in the questionnaire which could have precluded the donation of extra 
credit course points from the participants‟ allocation of ten such points. However at the time 
of completing the questionnaire, the participants would not have been sure that their 
identifying information could be taken as they handed in their completed questionnaires, with 
their donation of extra credit course points being noted along with the balance to be credited 
towards the calculation of their course grade. 
Participants. A sample of 70 undergraduate students enrolled in the large Introductory 
Marketing class participated in the study. This class is required for all business majors and 
open to all majors. 47% of the sample was female and their average age was 21.74 years (SD 
= 3.61, range = 19 – 39). These demographic characteristics did not have any significant 
effect on the dependant variables and are not discussed further.  
Design and Procedure. The sample participants were assigned at random to one of two 
cells, with the target of donation varying in social distance being the between-subjects factor 
(marketing major or nursing major). The procedure followed was identical to the second 
study. However, participants were debriefed after submitting their questionnaire to the effect 
that they would receive all of their ten extra course credit points regardless of their responses 
in the questionnaire. The procedure and associated instruments, including the debrief form 
were approved by a university-level Institutional Review Board. 
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Measures 
Relative Use of Affect vs. Cognition. The predominant use of affect or cognition in arriving 
at an amount to donate was assessed using the same five-item scale as before (Shiv and 
Fedorikhin 2002). The scale asked participants what drives their final decisions on donations 
followed by five seven-point semantic differential scales. The reliability of these five items 
was assessed so as to enable the formation of a single measure. The resulting reliability 
coefficient was satisfactory (α = 0.84) which enabled the average of the five items (M = 3.85, 
SD = 1.39) to be calculated so as to form a single measure of the relative use of affect or 
cognition in arriving at the dependant variable. The first dependant variable was the answer 
to the question, “How likely is it that you would contribute some of your extra credit points?” 
with the response elicited on a seven-point scale anchored by Very Unlikely and Very Likely. 
The second dependant variable was the answer to the question “How would you feel about 
contributing …” with the response elicited on a seven-point scale anchored by Very Negative 
and Very Positive.  The third dependant variable was the numerical answer to the question, 
“How many of the TEN extra credit points do you give? Please divide your points to clearly 
indicate how many should go to the other student and how many for yourself. The total 
should equal TEN points.” 
Manipulation Checks. Separate samples of students completed various measures assessing 
the closeness they felt to either a marketing student or a nursing student. Participants 
indicated their level of agreement on a seven-point scale anchored by Strongly Disagree and 
Strongly Agree. There were significant differences in participants‟ responses (t(63) = 1.9, p 
(one- tailed) = 0.03) to the statement “I would most probably like the same things as the 
student”,  with responses to a student who is a marketing major (M = 4.25) being higher than 
for a student who is a nursing major (M = 3.48). A possible confound could have been that 
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participants felt that a nursing major would need more help than a marketing major to get 
through a class in Marketing. Participants‟ reaction to the statement “The student needs the 
extra credit points more than I do” did not reveal any significant differences between 
participants‟ responses for a marketing major vs. those for a nursing major. 
Results 
Seventy undergraduate participants provided responses to the question regarding 
likelihood of donation. The hypothesis was that social distance would moderate the effect of 
differences in the use of affect or cognition on the likelihood of donation. In order to reveal 
any significant differences, the variation in social distance was contrast coded (1 for 
marketing major and -1 for nursing major). This contrast code was multiplied by the score on 
the measure of relative use of affect or cognition to yield the interaction term. The dependant 
variable of likelihood that the participant would have contributed was regressed (R
2
 = 0.09) 
on the contrast code for social distance to yield a significant simple main effect (t = -2.128, p 
= .037, partial η
2
 = 0.064). However, the simple main effect of the relative measure of the use 
of affect or cognition did not reach significance. As predicted the interaction of the two 
showed differences (t = 1.988, p = .051, partial η
2
 = 0.057). This indicated marginal support  
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Essay 1 - Study 3
DV = Likelihood of Donation
Social distance t (1, 66) = -2.13, p = 0.037
Affect vs. cognition t (1, 66) = -1.26, p  = 0.213
Interaction t (1, 66) =  1.99, p = 0.05 (H2)
n.s. p = 0.018
 
Figure 4 Interaction of Social Distance with Affect vs. Cognition 
for dependant variable of likelihood of donation in third experiment of first essay 
 
for the hypothesis of interaction – social distance moderated increased reliance on affect as 
opposed to cognition.  
The results indicate that when the donation target is farther off socially from the donor, 
participants indicating increased reliance on affect for making the decision to donate show 
greater likelihood of making a donation. When the social distance between the donation 
target and donor is decreased, the differences in likelihood are effectively neutralized with 
even a seeming reversal. Regression analysis was employed to reveal the nature of the 
interaction. In the first regression model, within the condition of closer social distance 
(marketing student) there was no significant effect of the relative use of affect or cognition on 
likelihood to donate. This was not the case in the condition of greater social distance (nursing 
student) where a significant effect (t = - 2.48, p = 0.018) of the relative use of affect vs. 
cognition was found on likelihood of donation.   
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The same procedure was followed for the second dependant variable of feelings about 
making a donation. To reveal the significance of social distance, the dependant variable was 
regressed (R
2
 = 0.12) on the contrast code for social distance (t = -2.607, p = .011, partial η
2
 = 
0.093). Further, there was no simple main effect of the relative measure of use of affect or 
cognition. As expected the interaction of the two reached significance (t = 2.159, p = .034, 
partial η
2
 = 0.066). This indicated support for the hypothesis of interaction – the effect of 
increased reliance on affect as opposed to cognition by participants appeared to be moderated 
by the effects of social distance on the feelings about making a donation.  
Essay 1 - Study 3
DV = Feelings about Donation
Social distance t (1, 66) = -2.61, p = 0.011
Affect vs. cognition t (1, 66) = -0.94, p  = 0.352
Interaction t (1, 66) =  2.16, p = 0.034 (H2)
n.s. p = 0.03
 
Figure 5 Interaction of Social Distance with Affect vs. Cognition 
for dependant variable of feelings about donation in third experiment of first essay 
 
The results indicate that when the donation target is farther off socially from the donor, 
those gravitating more towards affect for making their donation decision to donate show 
more positive feelings about making the donation. When the social distance between the 
donation target and donor is decreased, this effect is nullified. Regression analyses were 
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conducted to establish the origin of the interaction. For the condition of lesser social distance 
(marketing student) the regression of feelings about donation on the relative use of affect or 
cognition was not significant. This was not the case in the condition of greater social distance 
(nursing student) where the regression analysis emerged as significant (t = -2.26, p = 0.03). 
What is interesting is the feeling about making a donation is less positive with decreasing 
social distance, regardless of whether the participant uses affect or cognition. 
Finally, for the third dependant variable of how many points the participants would 
donate, a regression (R
2
 = 0.19) on the contrast code for social distance yielded the simple 
main effect (t = -2.459, p = .017, partial η
2
 = 0.084). There was a significant simple main 
effect of the measure of the relative use of affect or cognition (t = -2.656, p = .01, partial η
2
 = 
0.097). Most crucially was the interaction of the two (t = 1.968, p = .053, partial η
2
 = 0.055). 
The marginal significance of the interaction term indicates support for the hypothesis of  
Essay 1 - Study 3
DV = Donation of Course Credit
Social distance t (1, 66) = -2.46, p = 0.017
Affect vs. cognition t (1, 66) = -2.66, p = 0.01 (H1)
Interaction t (1, 66) =  1.97, p = 0.05 (H2)
n.s. p = 0.003 
 
Figure 6 Interaction of Social Distance with Affect vs. Cognition 
for dependant variable of donation of course credit in third experiment of first essay 
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interaction – the effect of participants demonstrating greater reliance on affect as opposed to 
cognition appeared to be moderated by the effects of social distance.  
The results indicate that when the donation target is farther off socially from the donor, 
those with a disposition to use their level of affect for making the decision to donate, exhibit 
higher donations of extra credit course points. When the social distance between the donation 
target and donor is decreased, this effect appears to be nullified. To reveal the actual nature of 
the interaction, regression analyses were run as before. Within the condition of lesser social 
distance (marketing student) the regression of the number of extra credit points donated on 
the relative use of affect vs. cognition was not significant. However, in the condition of 
greater social distance the effect was significant (t = - 3.25, p = 0.003). 
Discussion 
The third study replicates the results of the first and second studies indicating support for 
the hypothesis that there is a moderating effect of social distance on  participants‟ use of 
predominantly affect or cognition in their processing of decisions as to how much to donate 
to needy recipients. Further, it also reveals the same effects in the measures of likelihood of 
donation and feelings about donation. In this study, I turned to a different sort of donation – 
donating extra course credit points to a student who was prevented by illness or work 
schedule from getting the extra course credit points. I manipulated social distance by painting 
the victim as either a nursing major or marketing major. By doing so I removed any effects of 
students‟ existing resources. By their participation in the research in order to gain extra 
course credit participants indicated that they valued the points and would have been loath to 
give up such points. Participants indicated that they were willing to donate an average of 1.49 
points with standard deviation of 1.81 points and a range from zero to seven points out of a 
possible ten points. It must be noted that students were unaware of the fact that there was no 
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actual donation of the extra course credit points until they were debriefed after the submission 
of their completed questionnaire.  
General Discussion 
 
Across three studies I have shown that there is a moderation by social distance on the use 
of affect as opposed to cognition that leads to greater contributions (albeit hypothetical in the 
first two studies). This social distance is that which exists between donors and recipients. 
Some of the findings of marginal significance may be due  to the hypothetical context as well 
as the differing worldviews of a student sample as compared to adult donors  or the 
immediacy of the victims as used in the previous studies (Kogut and Ritov 2007; Winterich, 
Mittal and Ross 2009). My conjecture is supported by the significant effects of interaction 
that was got in the third study which involved seemingly actual and immediate donations to a 
fellow student of a resource that was of value to the undergraduate sample. 
The theoretical implications of the findings in this essay relate to the use of affect as an 
input to decision making. I have examined the possibility that people may be more driven by 
affect, especially when they are motivated by considerations of “warm-glow” utility. From 
these theoretical implications flow input for managers, in that in order to induce greater 
donations it might be preferable that donors rely on their affect rather than their cognition 
especially when greater social distance is existent between donor and recipient. 
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CHAPTER 3  
THE EFFECT OF EMPATHY ON CHARITABLE DONATIONS AND 
THE MODERATING EFFECT OF PSYCHOLOGICAL DISTANCE 
 
“You know, there's a lot of talk in this country about the federal deficit. But I think we 
should talk more about our empathy deficit -- the ability to put ourselves in someone else's 
shoes; to see the world through the eyes of those who are different from us -- the child who's 
hungry, the steelworker who's been laid-off, the family who lost the entire life they built 
together when the storm came to town. When you think like this -- when you choose to 
broaden your ambit of concern and empathize with the plight of others, whether they are 
close friends or distant strangers -- it becomes harder not to act; harder not to help.” 
   - Barack Obama in his Commencement Address at Xavier University 
(2006) 
 
The notion of psychological distance has most frequently been studied in its four 
manifestations of temporal, hypothetical, physical and social distance (Trope and Liberman 
2010). The previous chapter documented the effects of social distance on the relative use of 
affect versus cognition. In this chapter, I examine the moderating role of the other three of 
these manifestations of psychological distance on empathy. While there are the four 
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manifestations of psychological distance that have been established, there may be other 
manifestations, especially related to consumer psychology as suggested by Fiedler (2007). 
While the effects of psychological distance on charitable donations have not been 
explicitly examined, there is a great deal of work that can be subsumed under that head. 
Diverse studies point to the effects of variation in types of psychological distance to various 
targets, in a charitable donation context. For example, distance between the donor and the 
recipient, distance between the donor and an agent acting on behalf of the recipient (a 
fundraising organization) and distance between the donor and other donors. Peter Reingen 
(1982) was possibly the first to indicate the role of connectedness in charitable donations. He 
showed that if potential donors are shown a list of people who have already donated, they 
will increase their donation intentions and size of their donations, especially if the list is 
larger rather than smaller. Donors may also seek to enhance their status by following the lead 
of donors who are high in status (Kumru and Vesterlund 2010) or seek to signal their greater 
status by their acts of donation (Glazer and Konrad 1996). Fisher and Ackerman (1998) 
showed that participants were more likely to donate provided the group they belonged to was 
in need of their efforts. Peloza and White (2006) examined the role of public versus private 
donation behavior, hypothesizing that this could lead to significant differences. Similarly, 
Grace and Griffin (2006) in their theoretical paper predict that donation will depend on 
interpersonal factors. Andreoni and Scholz (1998) showed that less social distance to other 
donors will result in greater charitable donations. Viewing these studies through the lens of 
psychological distance, it would suggest that with decreasing psychological distance to other 
donors, the quantum of donations would increase.  
Naturally, psychological distance refers to perceived or the subjective experience of 
distance. As such, it is quite possible for a donor to feel that there is negligible distance 
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between himself and a recipient of his charity on the other side of the world as there is for a 
neighbor to feel the same about the person who lives next door. The most crucial aspect of 
psychological distance in a charity context must be that which exists between the donor and 
recipient. Small and Simonsohn (2007) found that a person showed greater sympathy and 
prosocial behavior towards the victim of a misfortune if the person knew someone else who 
had suffered a similar misfortune. They also showed that the degree of sympathy and pro-
social behavior increased with the intensity of the relationship with a previously known 
victim of a similar misfortune. In this case, it would seem that less psychological distance 
between the donor and someone known to the donor, resulted in greater benefits to an 
unknown victim provided both the victim and person known to the donor had suffered the 
same misfortune. Similarly, Small and Loewenstein (2003) found that even a minimum 
degree of identifiability such as lessening the abstraction associated with helping “a” victim 
compared to helping “the” victim, increased prosocial behavior. In their manipulation they 
contrasted the effects of informing their participants that a family had been selected for 
receipt of their munificence compared to informing them that a family would be selected in 
the future. A family that has been selected could result in a perception that the donor knows 
them and therefore less psychological distance because it is possible to identify them. A 
family that has not been so selected will remain at a greater psychological distance because 
no identifying information is available for them. This effect is buttressed by the findings of 
Small, Loewenstein and Slovic (2007) that when people are shown a portrayal of a single 
victim they are more likely to donate regardless of the number of people affected and despite 
debiasing instructions aimed at getting people to adopt a mindset rooted in statistics. In one of 
their papers, Kogut and Ritov (2005) showed that the ability to individuate among victims 
was a persistent factor even when the number of victims was small compared to when the 
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number of victims was large. Rationality in the economic sense would decree that as the 
number of victims increased so would the contributions as donors perceived an increased 
need. In a later paper, the authors (Kogut and Ritov 2007) showed that identifiability was 
related to the perception of the recipient being part of the participant‟s in-group. This finding 
resonates with that of Kunstman and Plant (2008) who found that the speed and quality of 
help appeared to depend on the ethnicity of the donor and recipient. They found that as the 
need for help rose, white participants were slower in offering help and also decreased the 
quality of help offered to black victims – however, they did not find the same effect when the 
ethnicities of victim and donor were reversed. Finally, Grau and Folse (2007) found that 
portraying the donation as having effects that were local rather than at greater distance, was 
beneficial on attitudes and behavioral intentions. 
These findings seem to suggest that any effect that lessens the psychological distance 
appears to enhance prosocial behavior by donors towards recipients. Different ways in which 
this effect is achieved include the lessening of thinking about victims in the abstract by 
providing individuating information or by participants being acquainted with a victim who 
has suffered the same misfortune or who is at a lesser social distance by virtue of having the 
same ethnicity. All of these effects result in the perception of decrease in psychological 
distance, whether it be of hypothetical distance by showing an individual rather than showing 
one among a number of victims or whether it be of social distance by portraying the victims 
as of the same ethnicity as participants or whether it be of physical distance by portraying the 
benefits as local rather than national. It is probable that similar effects would be seen with 
differences in temporal distance.  
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Einfühlung  - Close-up or Far Away 
 
Yet, it would also be necessary to consider the effects of empathy which has reliably had 
an effect on charitable donations. Much work in the psychology literature has found that 
increased empathy is beneficial for prosocial behavior (Eisenberg and Miller 1987).  
Empathy is defined for the purposes of this dissertation as “Einfühlung”, a German word 
roughly translated as “to feel one‟s way into”. In other words, “being cognitively aware of 
another person‟s internal states and/ or putting oneself in the place of another and 
experiencing his or her feelings” (Bagozzi and Moore 1994, 58) or “one‟s ability to 
experience and understand another person‟s affective or psychological state” (Argo, Zhu and 
Dahl 2008, 615). However, it is important to distinguish sympathy from empathy (Wispé 
1986; Escalas and Stern 2003; Loewenstein and Small 2007), as these terms have been 
sometimes used interchangeably and sometimes have been confused with each other. 
Sympathy may be thought of as “the heightened awareness of the suffering of another person 
as something to be alleviated” whereas empathy can be defined as “the attempt by one self-
aware self to comprehend unjudgementally the positive and negative experiences of another 
self” (Wispé 1986, 318). To summarize Wispé (1986) states that “empathy is a way of 
knowing” and “sympathy is a way of relating”. Escalas and Stern (2003) looked at the effects 
on attitudes towards a dramatic advertisement and found that sympathy played a mediating 
role on the effects of advertisement type and this mediational role for sympathy was in turn 
mediated by empathy. They identified the definition of sympathy in consumer research as “a 
person‟s awareness of the feelings of another but not absorption in the feelings themselves” 
whereas in the case of empathy it has been defined as “an emotional response that stems from 
another‟s emotional state or condition and that is congruent with the other‟s emotional state 
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or situation” (Escalas and Stern 2003, 567).  Pointing to the important role of empathy, Basil, 
Ridgway and Basil (2008) found that the effect of a persuasive message on donation 
intentions was mediated by empathy which in turn was mediated by anticipatory guilt. Using 
a context of child-abuse, which tends to arouse negative emotions, Bagozzi and Moore 
(1994) found that empathy partially mediated a decision to help. It appears that empathy 
enhances the effects of persuasion in a charity context and predominantly is hypothesized at 
as acting as a moderator in studies that have examined the role of various contextual factors 
on prosocial behavior (Eisenberg and Miller 1987; Graziano et al 2007). 
 
H1: Greater dispositional empathy would be associated with higher propensity to donate. 
 
While the beneficial effects of empathy on charitable donations are well documented, the 
exact motivations are somewhat nebulous. A group of social psychologists led by Batson 
have advocated for the empathy-altruism hypothesis that predicts prosocial behavior has an 
ultimate goal of increasing another‟s welfare (Batson et al 1983). The most commonly used 
mode of establishing that persons high in empathy exhibit prosocial behavior regardless of 
the situation is that of providing experimental participants with an easy escape from the 
situation that exposes them to a recipient (Stocks, Lishner and Decker 2009).  The theorists in 
this tradition believe that prosocial behavior including charitable donation resulting from 
empathy is a result of the awakening of altruistic motivation which has as its ultimate goal the 
increase of another‟s welfare. In contrast, another group of social psychologists of which 
Cialdini may be the leading proponent, believe that self-interest motivates prosocial behavior 
(Cialdini et al 1987). In this altruism as hedonism approach, it is posited that people exhibit 
prosocial behavior in order for selfish gain such as reducing the negative affect that results 
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from realization of another‟s need (Dovidio 1991). It can be appreciated that to untangle true 
altruism that is concerned only with the welfare of another and has no selfish benefit, from 
prosocial behavior that has a benefit for the donor, is a problem that has proved to be 
intractable. Any form of prosocial behavior may confer some sort of benefit to the donor. 
This includes assuaging negative effect that empathizing with a person in need may have as 
empathy is experiencing what the other experiences (Batson et al 1983; Cialdini et al 1987; 
Batson, Fultz and Schoenrade 1987). It may also confer the benefit of bolstering self-esteem 
when mortality is salient (Jonas et al 2002; Hirschberger, Ein-Dor and Almakias 2008). 
Research that has the objective of finding support for the empathy-altruism hypothesis has 
been on demonstrating the lack of effects that can be predicted from the self-interest 
approach. Proponents of the theory that pure altruism motivates some donors to give their 
resources purely for the benefit of a recipient and not that of themselves, cannot directly 
demonstrate the effect of altruism. Any form of prosocial behavior including charitable 
donations, can be construed as conferring some benefit to the donor regardless of the benefit 
to the recipient. Hence, research in this area has taken the form of theorists suggesting 
possible benefits that someone could accrue through prosocial behavior and sometimes 
demonstrating initial support for this. This is followed by advocates of the pure altruism 
motivation conducting research meant to rule out those benefits with the default then being 
that pure altruism exists. For example, Batson et al (1997) attempted to demonstrate that 
empathy-induced helping was not due to a more expansive definition of the self by donors so 
as to include recipients. Similarly, in reaction to the notion that people act in a prosocial 
manner to gain or avoid, rewards or punishments specific to the empathy construct, Batson et 
al (1988) conducted experiments which resulted in patterns of results that were more in tune 
with the empathy-altruism account than the empathy-specific reward and the empathy-
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specific punishment hypotheses. Another hypothesis examined by Batson et al (1991) was the 
empathic joy explanation for why people would behavior in a prosocial manner. The essence 
of the empathic joy hypothesis is that donors are able to enjoy what the recipient feels in a 
vicarious manner. To sum up, various alternate accounts of the goals that people pursue 
through prosocial behavior other than pure altruism have been shown to be deficient through 
experiments that test an aspect of the account and show that the pure altruism account fits the 
pattern of results better than the alternate.  
Many people believe in a “just world” and prosocial behavior may help in restoring their 
belief when confronted with the injustice of distribution of resources. People who believe in a 
“just world” take the view that they live in a world in which they can get what they deserve 
and deserve what they get (Lerner 1971). Zuckerman (1975) conducted experiments that 
indicated participants were ready to commit themselves to participate in an experiment or 
help a blind student who was enrolled in the same course they were taking, provided that they 
were high on belief in a “just world” and their exams were soon. The rationale being that 
participants who scored high on belief in a “just world” would also believe that by helping 
someone, they would in turn be helped on their exams. Further, Hafer (2000) found that 
participants when exposed to a situation featuring an “innocent” victim tended to attempt to 
maintain their belief in a “just world” by derogating the victim or somehow attributing the 
circumstances that the victim found herself in to actions by the victim. Derogation of a victim 
in distress has been demonstrated (Mills and Egger 1972). This includes some of the 
literature related to Terror Management Theory (Hirschberger 2006) as well as studies 
relating hostile sexism to derogation of a victim of acquaintance rape (Abrams et al 2003). 
Harking back to the definition of empathy as a person‟s ability to feel the feelings of 
another, it would appear that such a process would be enhanced if the other was at a lesser 
48 
psychological distance to the donor. Such lessening of psychological distance would lend 
itself to less effort at achieving “Einfühlung”. Under such circumstances, those who are high 
in dispositional empathy may attempt to bolster their belief in a “just world” by attempting to 
mitigate the negative effects on the recipient. In contrast, those who are lower on 
dispositional empathy may attempt to derogate a victim who is at lesser psychological 
distance from them. In view of this prediction, it is proposed to treat empathy as a 
dispositional rather than a manipulated construct for the empirical studies. 
Empathy must be treated with some caution since it is a dispositional variable as well as a 
variable amenable to manipulation – one which demonstrates the effects of manipulation of a 
stimulus. Empathy has been treated as a dispositional variable and measured (Argo, Zhu and 
Dahl 2008). In that paper the first two studies used gender as a proxy for empathy on the 
grounds that females tend to be more empathetic than males. In their third study, the authors 
measured empathy and dichotomized it using a median-split procedure yielding “high 
empathizers” and “low empathizers”, which were females and males respectively in their 
previous studies.  
It is well-known in psychology that some people empathize more than others and in 
consumer research that has measured the construct of empathy, it has been treated as being in 
response to a stimulus (Bagozzi and Moore 1994; Escalas and Stern 2003; Basil, Ridgway 
and Basil 2008). Since, there are differences in the values of the construct when it was 
measured in response to a single stimulus, it seems likely that participants differed in their 
capacity for empathy. In order to examine the role that empathy plays in the presence of 
being able to escape a situation that indicates need, Stocks, Lishner and Decker (2009) 
manipulated empathy. They found that even when the option of escape existed, higher rates 
of helping were brought on by greater empathic arousal. To sum up, empathy can be a 
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dispositional variable as well as a manipulated variable. In the empirical section of this essay 
it is operationalized as a dispositional variable that must be measured. 
 
H2: The beneficial effect of greater empathy will be exacerbated when the donor and 
recipient are separated by lesser psychological distance (physical, temporal and hypothetical) 
and attenuated when there is greater psychological distance. An interaction will exist between 
dispositional empathy and psychological distance. 
 
In the next empirical section support is found for the hypotheses in three studies. In these 
studies, three dimensions of psychological distance, viz. temporal, physical and hypothetical 
are manipulated and dispositional empathy is measured. 
Study 1 
 
The first study was undertaken to find the moderating effect of temporal distance on 
dispositional empathy in the context of charitable donations. The scenario was designed to 
involve actual donations rather than intent to donate. Potential participants were students 
enrolled in the large Marketing section on the main campus at a major public university in the 
United States. Students enrolled in this class are eligible to receive ten points (which is added 
to a possible 1,000 points which decides their grade) for participation in research. About half 
of the students in the class (total enrolment of 1,500 students) choose to participate in 
research and receive ten points by virtue of their participation as subjects in experimental 
research. In this study, participants were asked how many of the ten extra credit points that 
they were earning, would they be willing to donate to a fellow student who could not 
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participate in the exercise due to illness or a conflicting work schedule. To manipulate 
temporal distance, students were told that the extra credit points would be donated to the 
needy student either at the end of the next week or at the end of the semester. It should be 
noted that this study was conducted in the first half of the semester. Participants were asked if 
they would like to donate between zero and ten extra credit points to help the needy fellow 
student. Participants were debriefed on the purpose of the research after completing and 
submitting their questionnaires, in the process receiving reassurance that they would receive 
their ten points regardless of whether they had chosen to donate or how many points they had 
chosen to donate. It does not seem likely that there was any social pressure to donate on the 
participants as they completed the questionnaire in private and submitted it before being 
debriefed. Further, there was no identifying information elicited in the questionnaire. It must 
be noted that at the time of completing the questionnaire, the participants would imagine that 
their identity would be revealed as they handed in their completed questionnaires, with their 
donation of extra credit course points being noted along with the balance to be credited 
towards the calculation of their course grade. 
Participants. A sample of 68 undergraduate students enrolled in the large Introductory 
Marketing class participated in the study. This class is required for all business majors and 
open to all majors. 51% of the sample was female and their average age was 21.13 years (SD 
= 4.13, range = 18 – 44). While there was no significant effect of age on the dependant 
variables, there were significant effects of gender with females showing differences from 
males. Previous research has hinted at females being possessed of a disposition that makes 
them more prone to empathize than males (Argo, Zhu and Dahl, 2008). In terms of the 
dependant variable measuring likelihood to donate which was measured on a seven-point 
scale, females showed greater likelihood than males (t  = - 2.51, p = 0.015). The mean for 
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females was greater than that for males (M = 2.89 vs. M = 1.88) with greater values 
indicating higher likelihood of donating. Similarly the number of points actually donated 
showed that females donated marginally (t = - 1.71, p = 0.09) more than males (M = 1.89 vs. 
M = 1.15). However, these demographic variables did not play a significant role in the 
regression analyses hereunder described.  
Design and Procedure. The sample participants were assigned at random to one of two 
cells, with the target of donation varying in temporal distance being the between-subjects 
factor (donation of points within a week or at the end of the semester). The procedure 
followed was that participants registered their attendance and then picked up a set of 
questionnaires. They completed these questionnaires in private at their own pace. As they 
submitted the completed questionnaires, participants were debriefed by assuring them that 
they would receive all of their ten extra course credit points regardless of their responses in 
the completed questionnaire. The procedure and associated instruments, including the debrief 
form were approved by a university-level Institutional Review Board. 
Measures 
Scale Measuring Dispositional Empathy. Participants completed a seven-item scale which 
measured their disposition for “empathic concern” (Davis 1980, 85). The instructions at the 
top of the scale asked participants to indicate the extent to which they agreed or disagreed 
with each item. This was followed by seven semantic differential scales, each anchored at its 
left extreme by “Strongly Disagree” and at the right extreme by “Strongly Agree.” Separating 
the two extremes were seven scale points. Three of the items were reverse coded scales. The 
reliability of these seven items was assessed so as to enable the formation of a single 
measure. The resulting reliability coefficient was satisfactory (α = 0.77) which enabled the 
average of the five items (M = 5.31, SD = 0.91) to be calculated so as to form a single 
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measure of the dispositional empathy of the participant. The dependant variable was the 
answer to the question, “How likely is it that you would contribute some of your extra credit 
points?” with the response elicited on a seven-point scale anchored by Very Unlikely and 
Very Likely.  
Manipulation Checks. The manipulation check employed to establish the efficacy of the 
temporal distance manipulation was participants‟ reaction to the statement “The student who 
needs help in the scenario will NOT get it very soon.” Participants indicated their agreement 
with this statement using a seven-point semantic differential scale anchored by “Strongly 
disagree” and “Strongly agree”. Analysis indicated a significant difference between the two 
groups (t (67) = - 1.71, p (one-tailed) = 0.046) with participants in the group considering a 
donation at the end of the semester indicating greater agreement (M = 4.94) than participants 
in the group considering a donation within a week (M = 4.24).   
Results 
Sixty eight undergraduate participants provided responses to the question regarding 
likelihood of donation. The hypothesis was that temporal distance would moderate the effect 
of differences in participants‟ dispositional empathy on the likelihood of donation. In order to 
reveal any significant differences, the variation in temporal distance was contrast coded (1 for 
donation taking effect within a week and -1 for donation taking effect at the end of the 
semester). This contrast code was multiplied by the score on the collapsed measure of 
empathic concern to yield the interaction term. The dependant variable of likelihood that the 
participant would have contributed was regressed (R
2
 = 0.15) on the contrast code for 
temporal distance, the measure of dispositional empathy and the interaction of the two. There 
was a significant effect of the collapsed measure of empathy on the dependant variable (t = 
2.14, p = .04, partial η
2
 = 0.066). This provided support for the first hypothesis. As predicted 
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the interaction of the two showed marginal significance (t = 1.78, p = .08, partial η
2
 = 0.046). 
This indicated marginal support for the hypothesis of interaction – temporal distance 
moderated the effect of dispositional empathy on likelihood of donation.  
Essay 2 – Study 1
DV = Likelihood of Donation
Temporal distance t (1, 65) = -1.64, p = 0.107
Empathy t (1, 65) =  2.14, p = 0.036 (H1)
Interaction t (1, 65) =  1.78, p = 0.08 (H2)
p = 0.013 n.s.
 
Figure 7 Interaction of Temporal Distance with Empathy 
for dependant variable of likelihood of donation of course credit in first experiment of second 
essay 
 
The results indicate that when the donation target is closer in a temporal sense to the 
donor, increased dispositional empathic concern increases the likelihood of making a 
donation. When the temporal distance between the donation target and donor is increased, the 
differences in likelihood are effectively neutralized. In order to reveal the effect in detail two 
regression analyses were run as planned comparisons. When the variable indicating 
likelihood of donation was regressed on the measure of empathy only for the participants 
considering making a donation which was temporally closer, the effect was significant (t = 
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2.64, p = 0.01). However, the same analysis did not attain significance for participants 
considering making a donation which was temporally farther away.  
Discussion 
The first study in this chapter indicates support for the hypotheses that there is a simple 
main effect of dispositional empathy and a moderating effect of temporal distance on  
participants‟ dispositional empathy which they use in their processing of decisions as to how 
much to donate to needy recipients. A different sort of donation was used in this study – 
donating extra course credit points to a student who was prevented by illness or work 
schedule from getting the extra course credit points by participating in the study. I 
manipulated temporal distance by stating that the donation would take effect after a week or 
at the end of the semester. There may have been a reluctance or alternatively a readiness to 
donate points based on the student participants‟ current accumulation of points that counted 
towards their grade. However, there is no reason to assume that the hypothesized at between-
subject effects would be related to this. In addition, by their participation in the research in 
order to gain extra course credit, student participants indicated that they valued the points and 
would have been loath to give up such points.  
Study 2 
 
The second study was undertaken to find the moderating effect of physical distance on 
dispositional empathy in the context of charitable donations. The scenario was designed to 
involve actual donations rather than intent to donate. Potential participants were the students 
enrolled in the large Principles of Marketing section on the main campus at a major public 
university in the United States. Students enrolled in this class are eligible to receive ten points 
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(to be added to a possible 1,000 points they may accrue through exams and other 
assessments) for participation in research. It has been observed that about half the class (with 
a total enrolment of 1,500 students) volunteers to participate in research and receive ten 
points as a result of their participation as subjects in experimental research. As in the previous 
study, participants were asked how many of the ten extra credit points that they were 
expecting, would they be willing to donate to a fellow student who could not participate in 
the research due to illness or a conflicting work schedule. To manipulate physical distance, 
students were told that the needy student was either enrolled on the main Orlando campus as 
all of them were or was enrolled at the Ocala branch campus. Students at the branch 
campuses are enrolled in the same course but in a different section. They view the same video 
stream of the class as those main campus students who choose to watch the class at home on 
their computers or cell phones. Both sets of students may attend the live class subject to 
seating being available. However, students enrolled in the branch campuses take their exams 
at their campuses and earn their extra credit points through a different mechanism than the 
main campus students. Participants were asked if they would like to donate between zero and 
ten extra credit points to help the needy fellow student. Participants were debriefed after 
completing and submitting their questionnaires, in the process reassuring them that they 
would receive their ten points regardless of whether they had chosen to donate or how many 
points they had chosen to donate. It does not seem likely that there was any social pressure to 
donate on the participants as they completed the questionnaire in seclusion and their 
debriefing took place after they had submitted their completed questionnaire. Further, there 
was no identifying information elicited in the questionnaire. It must be noted that at the time 
of completing the questionnaire, the participants would imagine that as they handed in their 
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completed questionnaires, their donation of extra credit course points would be noted along 
with the balance to be credited towards the calculation of their course grade. 
Participants. A sample of 70 undergraduate students enrolled in the large Introductory 
Marketing class participated in the study. 44% of the sample was female and their average 
age was 21.16 years (SD = 3.75, range = 19 – 42). These demographic variables had no 
significant effect on the dependant variables and are not addressed in further analysis. 
 Design and Procedure. The sample participants were assigned at random to one of two 
cells, with the target of donation varying in physical distance being the between-subjects 
factor (recipient of donated points being a student at Ocala or Orlando). All participants first 
registered their attendance to earn their ten extra credit points and then picked up a set of 
questionnaires. They completed these questionnaires in private at their own pace. Once they 
submitted the completed questionnaires, participants were assured that they would receive all 
of their ten extra course credit points regardless of their responses in the questionnaire. This 
assurance was provided in a debrief form which participants were handed to read. The 
procedure and associated instruments, including the debrief form were approved by a 
university-level Institutional Review Board. 
Measures 
Scale Measuring Dispositional Empathy. Participants completed a seven-item scale which 
measured their disposition for “empathic concern” (Davis 1980, 85). Participants read 
instructions at the top of the scale asking them to indicate the extent to which they agreed or 
disagreed with each item. Underneath these instructions were seven semantic differential 
scales, each anchored at its left end by “Strongly Disagree” and at the right end by “Strongly 
Agree.” Between these two ends were seven scale points. Three of the scales were reverse 
coded. The reliability of these seven items was assessed so as to enable the formation of a 
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single measure. The resulting reliability coefficient was satisfactory (α = 0.83) which enabled 
the average of the five items (M = 5.36, SD = 0.97) to be calculated so as to form a single 
measure of the dispositional empathy of the participant. The dependant variable was the 
numerical answer to the question, “How many of the TEN extra credit points do you give? 
Please divide your points to clearly indicate how many should go to the other student and 
how many for yourself. The total should equal TEN points.” 
Manipulation Checks. The manipulation check employed to establish the efficacy of the 
physical distance manipulation was participants‟ reaction to the statement “The student who 
needs help in the scenario seems to be far away.” Participants indicated their agreement with 
this statement using a seven-point semantic differential scale anchored by “Strongly 
disagree” and “Strongly agree”. Analysis indicated a significant difference between the two 
groups (t (68) = - 1.73, p (one-tailed) = 0.045) with participants in the group considering a 
donation to a student in Ocala indicating greater agreement (M = 5.29) than participants in 
the group considering a donation to a student on the Orlando campus (M = 4.6).   
Results 
Seventy undergraduate participants provided responses to the questionnaire. The 
hypothesis was that physical distance would moderate the effect of differences in 
participants‟ dispositional empathy on the number of points donated. The difference in 
physical distance was contrast coded (1 for donation to a student in the Orlando section and -
1 for donation to a student in the Ocala section). This contrast code was multiplied by the 
score on the collapsed measure of empathic concern to yield the interaction term. The 
dependant variable of number of points was regressed on the contrast code for temporal 
distance, the collapsed measure of dispositional empathy and the interaction of the two.  
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The results for the dependant variable of actual donation in the shape of number of extra 
credit course points given up for a fellow student yielded support for both hypotheses. A 
regression model (R
2
 = 0.17) was estimated with the independent variables of the contrast 
code for physical distance, the measure of dispositional empathy and the interaction of the 
two. The dependant variable was the number of extra credit points donated. There was a 
significant effect of the variable that was contrast-coded to indicate physical distance (t = - 
2.25, p = 0.03, partial η
2
 = 0.071) and a significant effect for the variable that indicated 
participants‟ level of dispositional empathy (t = 2.2, p = 0.03, partial η
2
 = 0.068). It appeared 
that those with higher scores on the collapsed measure of empathic concern donated more of 
their extra course credit points to a fellow student. This indicated support for the first 
hypothesis that higher levels of dispositional empathy increases charitable donation. For the 
test of the hypothesis predicting an interaction, there was a significant effect of the variable  
Essay 2 - Study 2 
DV = Donation of Course Credit
Physical distance t (1, 66) = -2.25, p = 0.028
Empathy t (1, 66) =  2.2,   p = 0.031 (H1)
Interaction t (1, 66) =  2.54, p = 0.014 (H2)
p = 0.008 n.s.
 
Figure 8 Interaction of Physical Distance with Empathy 
for dependant variable of donation of course credit in second experiment of second essay 
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capturing the interaction between physical distance and dispositional empathy (t = 2.54, p = 
0.01, partial η
2
 = 0.089).  Support for the second hypothesis was revealed. 
To reveal the precise nature of the interaction, each level of physical distance was blocked 
and the relation of the measure of dispositional empathy to actual number of points donated 
was examined. When the distance was greater, there was no significant effect of empathic 
concern on the amount of extra credit points donated. However, when the distance was 
lessened there was a significant effect (t = 2.82, p = 0.008) with participants donating more to 
help a student who was physically closer to them as their dispositional empathy increased. 
The results indicates that when the physical distance between donor and recipient is 
lessened, a higher degree of dispositional empathy measured as empathic concern makes the 
donor increase the actual donation. This effect is not seen with greater physical distance 
between donor and recipient.  
Discussion  
The second study in this chapter indicates support for the hypothesis that there is a 
moderating effect of physical distance on  participants‟ dispositional empathy which they 
employ when processing a decision as to how much to donate to needy recipients. Previous 
research has established the importance of dispositional empathy in increasing donations. The 
study also reveals that higher levels of dispositional empathy in the form of empathic concern 
results in increase in the quanta of actual donation. As done in the previous study, a different 
sort of donation was used in this study – donating extra course credit points to a student who 
was prevented by illness or work schedule from getting the extra course credit points by 
participating in the study. I manipulated physical distance by stating that the donation was to 
a student who was enrolled in the Orlando section or enrolled in the Ocala section. All 
participants were enrolled in the Orlando section. Students in the Ocala section went through 
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a different exercise to gain their extra credit points. As noted previously, there may have been 
a lesser or greater propensity to donate points based on the student participants‟ current 
accumulation of points that counted towards their grade. However, it cannot be assumed that 
the hypothesized at between-subject effects would be related to this. By their participation in 
the research in order to gain extra course credit, student participants indicated that they 
valued the points and would have been loath to give up such points.  
Study 3 
 
The third study was undertaken to find the moderating effect of hypothetical distance on 
dispositional empathy in the context of charitable donations. As before the scenario was 
designed to involve actual donations rather than hypothetical donations. The participants 
were volunteers from a large class of students taking Principles of Marketing on the main 
campus at a major public university in the United States. Students enrolled in this class are 
graded on a 1,000 point scale through exams and assignments. They may add ten points to 
their total of points by participation in research. About half of the students in the class (total 
enrolment of 1,500 students) choose to participate in research and receive the ten points as a 
result of their participation as subjects in experimental research. In this study, participants 
were asked how many of the ten extra credit points that they were earning, would they be 
willing to donate to a fellow student who could not participate in the research due to illness or 
a conflicting work schedule. To manipulate hypothetical distance, students were told that the 
needy student had already been chosen or would be chosen. A similar manipulation has been 
used successfully in previous studies on charitable donations (Small and Loewenstein 2003). 
Students would assume that the probability that a needy student would get their donation of 
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extra credit points would be greater if the student had already been chosen as opposed to 
would be chosen. Participants were asked if they would like to donate between zero and ten 
extra credit points to help the needy fellow student. After completing and submitting their 
questionnaires participants were debriefed, reassuring them that they would receive their full 
ten points even if they had chosen to donate and regardless of how many points they had 
chosen to donate. It does not seem likely that participants experienced any social pressure to 
donate as they completed the questionnaire in seclusion and were debriefed after they 
submitted their completed questionnaires. Within the questionnaire itself, no identifying 
information was elicited. The procedure was designed so that while they were completing the 
questionnaire, participants imagined that their identity would be revealed as they handed in 
their completed questionnaires and their donation of extra credit course points would be 
noted along with the balance to be credited towards the calculation of their course grade. 
Participants. Sixty nine undergraduate students enrolled in the large Introductory 
Marketing class participated in the study. 52% of the sample was female and their average 
age was 21.83 years (SD = 3.61, range = 18 – 36). There was no significant effect of 
demographic variables on the dependant variables.  
Design and Procedure. The sample participants were assigned at random to one of two 
cells, with the target of donation varying in hypothetical distance being the between-subjects 
factor (recipient of donation already identified or to be identified). The procedure followed 
was that participants registered their attendance and then picked up a set of questionnaires. 
They completed these questionnaires in private at their own pace. As they submitted the 
completed questionnaires, participants were debriefed by assuring them that they would 
receive all of their ten extra course credit points regardless of their responses in the 
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questionnaire. The procedure and associated instruments, including the debrief form were 
approved by a university-level Institutional Review Board. 
Measures 
Scale Measuring Dispositional Empathy. In order to measure participants‟ dispositional 
empathy a seven-item scale was used which measured their disposition for “empathic 
concern” (Davis 1980, 85). Participants first read the instructions at the top of the page asking 
them to indicate the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with each of the items. This was 
followed by seven semantic differential scales, each anchored by “Strongly Disagree” at the 
left and at the right by “Strongly Agree.” Separating the two anchors were seven scale points. 
Three of the items were reverse coded scales. The reliability of these seven items was 
assessed so as to enable the formation of a single measure. The resulting reliability 
coefficient was satisfactory (α = 0.75) which enabled the average of the five items (M = 5.26, 
SD = 0.9) to be calculated so as to form a single measure of the dispositional empathy of the 
participant. The dependant variable was the numerical answer to the question, “How many of 
the TEN extra credit points do you give? Please divide your points to clearly indicate how 
many should go to the other student and how many for yourself. The total should equal TEN 
points.” 
Manipulation Checks. The manipulation check employed to establish the efficacy of the 
hypothetical distance manipulation was participants‟ response to the statement “When I was 
reading the scenario I would describe my thoughts on whether to donate as:”. Participants 
indicated their response to this statement using a seven-point semantic differential scale 
anchored by “General” and “Specific”. Analysis indicated a significant difference between 
the two groups (t (66) = 2.02, p (one-tailed) = 0.024) with participants in the group 
considering a donation to a student who will be chosen indicating more general thoughts (M 
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= 4.23) than participants in the group considering a donation to a student who has been 
chosen (M = 5.12).   
Results 
Sixty eight undergraduate participants provided responses to the question regarding 
donation of extra credit to test the hypothesis that hypothetical distance would moderate the 
effect of differences in participants‟ dispositional empathy on donation. The variable 
indicating the level of hypothetical distance was contrast coded (1 for donation to an 
identified recipient and -1 for a to-be-identified recipient). This contrast code was multiplied 
by the score on the collapsed measure of empathic concern to yield the interaction term.  
A regression model was estimated with the contrast code indicating hypothetical distance, 
the measure of dispositional empathy and the interaction of the last two. The dependant 
variable was the number of points donated. The hypothesized at effects did manifest 
themselves in the regression (R
2
 = 0.24) as detailed below. The contrast code indicating 
hypothetical distance (recipient chosen vs. recipient to be chosen) was marginally significant 
(t = - 1.82, p = 0.074, partial η
2
 = 0.048). The measure of empathic concern used to indicate 
dispositional empathy was significant (t = 3.13, p = 0.003, partial η
2
 = 0.131). As before, this 
provided the first hypothesis with empirical backing. As predicted by the hypothesis, the 
interaction of hypothetical distance and dispositional empathy was significant (t = 2.22, p = 
0.03, partial η
2
 = 0.07).  
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Essay 2 - Study 3 
DV = Donation of Course Credit
Hypothetical distance t (1, 65) = -1.82, p = 0.074
Empathy t (1, 65) =  3.13, p = 0.003 (H1)
Interaction t (1, 65) =  2.22, p = 0.03 (H2)
p = 0.003 n.s.
 
Figure 9 Interaction of Hypothetical Distance with Empathy 
for dependant variable of donation of course credit in third experiment of second essay 
 
As before, separate regression analyses were run within each of the conditions of 
hypothetical distance. When the amount of donation of extra credit points was regressed on 
dispositional empathy in the condition of closer hypothetical distance; the recipient having 
already been chosen, a significant effect was revealed (t = 3.27, p = 0.003). This was not 
manifested in the condition of greater hypothetical distance or the recipient to be chosen. 
Discussion  
Support for the hypotheses is found in this study that there is a simple main effect of 
dispositional empathy and a moderating effect of hypothetical distance on  participants‟ 
dispositional empathy which they use in their processing of decisions as to how much to 
donate to needy recipients. A different sort of donation was used in this study – donating 
extra course credit points to a student who was prevented by illness or work schedule from 
getting the extra course credit points by participating in the study. I manipulated hypothetical 
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distance by stating that the donation would go to a student who had already been chosen to 
receive it or would be chosen to receive it. Participants may have been more or less willing to 
donate points based on their current accumulation of points that count towards their grade. 
However, there is no reason to assume that the hypothesized at between-subject effects would 
be related to this. In addition, by their participation in the research in order to gain extra 
course credit, student participants indicated that they valued the points and would have been 
loath to give up such points. 
General Discussion 
 
In three studies I have demonstrated that empathy which is usually considered to increase 
prosocial behavior as it increases, in fact depends on the level of psychological distance 
separating donor and recipient. In three studies, each addressing a different type of 
psychological distance – temporal, physical and hypothetical, I have shown that dispositional 
empathy is a factor when the psychological distance is lesser rather than greater. I have done 
so using what seems to be a donation of time – the extra credit points that a student receives 
for participating in research. This may be of concern as there is no research that indicates a 
mapping of extra credit points to monetary donations. It can be safely assumed that such a 
transformation will be of a monotonic nature.  Another area of concern could be that empathy 
was treated as a dispositional variable and measured rather than manipulated. I believe that 
such treatment enhances the external validity of this research. However, it would add to the 
contribution of this research if empathy were manipulated in further experiments and yielded 







“With malice toward none, with charity for all,  
with firmness in the right as God gives us to see the right, let us finish the work; we are in.” 
         - Abraham Lincoln (1865) 
In two essays I have revealed the effects of psychological distance on charitable donations. 
In the first essay, I showed that decisions on charitable donations based on affect are 
beneficial for recipients at greater social distance to the donor. In the second essay, I have 
added to the findings of beneficial effects of empathy on charitable donations by showing that 
this differs depending on whether the donor and recipient are separated by lesser 
psychological distance. 
The result of the research in my first essay gives credence to my argument that Andreoni‟s 
(1989, 1990) concept of impure altruism is echoed in the distinction between consummatory 
and instrumental motives (Holbrook and Hirschman 1982; Pham 1998). Specifically, when a 
donor is driven by “warm glow” utility and regards the act of donating as crucial as opposed 
to the victim who will benefit, the donor may be driven by consummatory motives that have a 
greater role for affect. As opposed to this, when a donor is driven by instrumental motives 
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and regards the optimum provision of a public good that she partakes of as most important, 
affect will play a lesser role as compared to cognition. 
I was somewhat surprised to find that participants on occasion donated more on average to 
socially distant victims than those that were closer to them. In his latest book Predictably 
Irrational (2010) Dan Ariely speaks of the distinction between the social world and the 
economic world. It may be that charitable donations are considered to have more to do with 
the social world and hence donating to a victim that was closer to them in a social sense may 
have led to the feeling that they would derive a benefit from their donation. In this case, they 
may not have wanted to derive utility from their donation leading to increased donations for 
socially distant victims. This may have been especially true for the increased donations of 
extra credit course points to nursing majors as opposed to marketing majors – nursing majors 
are socially very distant from marketing majors. Similarly, the “time-ask” effect documented 
by Liu and Aaker (2008) results in greater donations of money in case such requests for 
monetary donations were preceded by a request for a donation of the participant‟s time. Liu 
and Aaker suggest that asking a person to donate time may be a more personal and involving 
expenditure than money, thus increasing the subsequent donation of money. Perhaps the 
participants regarded the donation of extra credit points in the light of a donation of time. 
Student participants who were asked if they regarded the donation of extra credit points as 
being more equivalent to a donation of time or of money, were more inclined to regard it as 
the former rather than the latter. Since students pay fees to take a course, they could believe it 
to be similar to donating money. However, the mean when contrasted with the mid-point of 
the scale anchored at its ends by time and money respectively, indicated that students 
believed that donating extra credit points was more like a donation of time. The difference 
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between the scale mid-point and the mean was statistically significant (t (191) = - 3.63, p < 
0.001). 
To sum up my theoretical contribution in the first essay lies in showing the differential 
effects of affect versus cognition in the context of charitable donations. Charitable donations 
are per se a very different context and call for an entirely different type of theorizing as it 
involves the expenditure of resources without benefit to oneself. Previous studies examining 
the differences between the use of affect vs. cognition did so in a context that benefitted the 
participants. For instance, Shiv and Fedorikhin (1999) allowed their participants to make a 
choice between an option that was more affect-laden (chocolate cake) and an option that was 
more in tune with cognition about eating (fruit salad). In contrast, my between-subjects 
design required participants to choose how much they would donate to a victim and showed 
that increased affect as opposed to cognition would result in differences in donation. 
The implications for managers or practitioners who seek to raise funds for charitable 
purposes are clear. To increase donations it is better to ask donors in a context where they are 
more likely to rely on their affect rather than their cognitive mechanisms. Yet, the possible 
use of the HDIF heuristic indicates that making such requests when cognitive resources are 
likely to be constrained may actually harm the cause rather than benefit it. Instead, donors 
should be somehow induced to rely on the affect heuristic. Most donors feel a sense of 
separation or social distance from the needy victims. If a donor and a victim were both at the 
same level of need, then the donor would be loath to make a donation to a victim when the 
donor could be a victim herself. Actual geographical distance could exist between the donor 
and victim in addition to social distance which may exacerbate the lessening of donation due 
to instrumental motives arising from a desire to derive utility from the cause that the donor is 
contributing to. The manager who wants to increase donations should induce potential donors 
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to examine their feelings about the act of donation as opposed to the victim that the donation 
will benefit. This may appear somewhat counterintuitive but is a natural extension of the 
arguments put forth in the first essay. 
However, before such arguments are adopted, some of the deficiencies in the empirical 
section of these essays must be noted. As is usually the case when effects are documented 
using an undergraduate sample, questions arise as to the generalizability of the documented 
effects (Carpenter, Connolly and Myers 2008). There is research that indicates that the results 
of experiments conducted in the laboratory can be applied to the general population (List 
2004). My first essay endeavors to pre-empt such arguments in the third study that examines 
actual donations of a resource that is valued by undergraduates. The previous studies show 
the same effect in the case of donations but with the donation amounts being hypothetical. 
One of the extensions to this paper which merits examination is the priming of 
instrumental or consummatory motives as was done by Pham (1998). It somewhat surprised 
me when on average the donations to victims at a greater social distance was more than to 
victims at a lesser social distance. I ascribe this to the use of the affect felt at contemplating 
the donation which indeed is the crux of the dissertation. Yet, there may be a reversal such 
that victims at a closer social distance will benefit more from the priming of instrumental as 
opposed to consummatory motives. Indeed, the priming of one or the other type of motive 
may induce people to adopt different mindsets that may affect their behavior in a variety of 
contexts – not just in the context of charitable donations. A second extension would be the 
use of stimuli that aroused different levels of affect. Hibbert et al (2007) advocate that a 
moderate level of guilt induced in donors yields better dividends than either extreme of guilt 
– too little or too much. Similarly, stimuli that induce too little or too much affect may result 
in less utilization of the HDIF heuristic and consequently diminish fundraising. 
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My second essay considers the role of dispositional empathy in contexts of differing 
psychological distance. It is well established that greater empathy on the part of a donor 
elicits greater donations to help recipients (Eisenberg and Miller 1987). My research indicates 
that this is especially relevant when there is less temporal, physical or hypothetical distance 
separating donor and recipient. Participants reporting a greater disposition to be empathically 
concerned were willing to donate more of a resource that they valued compared to those 
whose disposition made them less empathically concerned. As empathy involves 
experiencing what another person experiences, it will be facilitated if there is a decrease in 
psychological distance. At lesser psychological distance those whose dispositions make them 
prone to empathize will be inclined to increase their donations, compared to those who are 
not so prone. 
The process by which this works may have to do with participants‟ belief in a “just world” 
(Zuckerman 1975). Encapsulated in the statement that “what goes around, comes around” is 
the belief that what happens to one is based on what one does. Participants confronted with a 
recipient who was at closer psychological distance and who are more prone to empathic 
concern, may on experiencing what the recipient is experiencing exhibit increased prosocial 
behavior. In contrast, those who are less prone to dispositional empathy, may derogate the 
recipient based on their belief in a “just world”. As they do not empathize with the recipient, 
they may derogate the recipient so as to feel that it is the recipient‟s fault that she finds 
herself in the situation where she needs assistance (Mills and Egger 1972). 
The implications for managers who are attempting to garner assistance for victims who are 
at a lesser psychological distance to the donors, are that those who are higher on dispositional 
empathy are more likely to respond with greater charitable donations. Since the three studies 
narrated in the second essay deal with temporal, physical and hypothetical distance; it would 
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appear that managers should target donors prone to greater empathic concern when asking for 
donations to help victims of a recent rather than distant negative event or when they are 
physically closer to the recipient rather than far away or when the recipients have been 
identified for help compared to them being part of an amorphous mass of victims in need of 
assistance. The link between empathy and altruistic behavior is well-established. Hence, it is 
likely that those who have donated in the past are more likely to demonstrate higher levels of 
dispositional empathy. Therefore when the psychological distance is decreased between 
donors and recipients, it may be to the advantage of the fundraising manager to target those 
who have already contributed rather than embark on a campaign to communicate with all 
potential donors. 
The limitations of the findings of the three experiments described in the second essay may 
be primarily the donation of extra credit points being somewhat different from actual 
monetary donations. On the one hand, extra credit points may be treated as an interval scaled 
variable and similar to number of dollars, on the other hand there appears to be no 
equivalence to dollars. In the future, it is proposed to demonstrate concurrent validity by 
replicating the experiments by using actual monetary donations. Further, the proposed 
experiments will also be designed to yield data so as to establish the underlying process such 
as derogation and participants‟ belief in a “just world”. Finally, empathy was treated as a 
dispositional construct. It would be desirable to enhance the argument for causality by 
manipulating the level of empathy that participants experience in making their decisions.  
Managers charged with fundraising in not-for-profit organizations face an onerous task. 
On the one hand their donors expect that their donations will be used to assist the recipients 
that the not-for-profit organization is purported to help. On the other hand, in order to raise 
donations used to help the recipients, the managers must invest in fundraising efforts such as 
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advertising and other means of communication to potential donors. There have been instances 
of the misuse of donated funds meant to benefit recipients but instead channeled into 
administrative and fundraising costs. Telephone solicitors working for an organization called 
Telemarketing Associates contacted donors to ask for donations to VietNow, an organization 
that was purported to work for veterans. Only 15% or $1.1 million of the amount raised was 
funneled to VietNow which spent 3.3% of that amount on charitable programs (Bowman 
2006). Another  instance of the practices of some not-for-profits was contained in a series of 
stories by the Orlando Sentinel on Florida Blood Centers. Florida Blood Centers was reported 
to be charging local hospitals $310 a pint for blood and the CEO was reported to earn an 
annual salary of close to $600,000 (Tracy July 16
th
 2009). The Internal Revenue Service 
requires not-for-profit organizations to file Form 990 on an annual basis. This form requires 
the organizations to report their program expenses, fundraising expenses and management & 
general expenses under separate heads (Hager 2003). There is some latitude as to allocating 
expenses to those heads as it is possible that the CEO of a not-for-profit may be working on 
implementing programs, opening the possibility of allocating part of his salary to 
management expenses and part to program expenses. This makes the data reported on Form 
990 somewhat nebulous. Despite these drawbacks the collated information provides an 
important input for donors who may access such information through websites such as 
www.GuideStar.org. Such information was the basis for research using a quasi-experimental 
design by Bowman (2006) who tracked the donations made through the Combined Federal 
Campaign by federal employees in the Chicago area. The years covered were 1999-2001 and 
the data includes actual donations by individuals to various organizations. Each federal 
employee decides on the recipients of her donations by consulting a Donor‟s Guide that 
contains the overhead ratios for each organization. An organization is flagged if its overhead 
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ratio is greater than 25% with a footnote explaining that the organization is taking steps to 
bring its overhead ratio below the 25% level. The overhead ratio is the sum of fundraising 
and general administrative expenses divided by total revenue. The results indicated that 
donations decreased with increase in overhead ratios but the effect was rather small leading 
the author to speculate that other factors, such as the importance of the missions of an 
organization played a more significant role.  
Apart from the possibility of reduction in donation due to donors perceiving higher 
overheads, not-for-profit organizations face declining donations due to economic factors. The 
last Giving USA report from The Center on Philanthropy at Indiana University, reports an 
inflation-adjusted decline of 3.2% in charitable donations in 2009. The analysts ascribe this 
decrease as being due to the recession. The total amount donated for the year 2009 was 
estimated to be $ 315.08 billion, with individual donations estimated at $ 227.41 billion. It is 
apparent that the “third sector” as it is sometimes called is rather large in terms of  revenues 
and expenditures in the USA. 
In addition to the primary segment of not-for-profit organizations that the findings of this 
dissertation is relevant for, mention must also be made of its applicability to for-profit 
organizations who solicit charitable donations or conduct programs meant to enhance their 
image of Corporate Social Responsibility (Webb and Mohr 1998). Most of the work that is 
classified as pertaining to Corporate Social Responsibility are those studies that examine 
whether contributions to charity on the part of the marketer lead to increases in the 
profitability of the marketer (Simmons and Becker-Olsen 2006). Since this increase in 
profitability has to come from customers spending more, the literature in Marketing has 
examined whether customers increase their spending in the knowledge that part of their 
expenditure is earmarked for charity. Alternatively they may switch their patronage to the 
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marketer for the same reason (Lichtenstein, Drumwright and Braig 2004). An example of the 
efficacy of such a strategy comes from the field of auction theory. Research indicates that 
when a percentage of the proceeds are earmarked for charity, bidders tend to increase their 
bids for the good that is being auctioned. In a paper that examined the revenues accruing 
from charity auctions where a percentage of the winning bid is to be donated to charity, it has 
been estimated that when bidders are informed that 25% of the winning bid is designated as 
proceeding to charity, the revenue accrued net of the charitable donation is more than that of 
a non-charity auction for the same good. The authors of that paper conducted field 
experiments for identical goods, one with a contribution to charity and the other without 
(Leszczyc and Rothkopf 2010). Arora and Henderson (2007) took a different view of cause-
related marketing, when they conceptualized a linkage to a social cause as an example of a 
promotional strategy. They found that at low denominations the linkage to a social cause was 
more effective than equivalent price discounts. The effectiveness of what is commonly 
known as cause-related marketing has been well established. The research mentioned and 
evidence from a multiplicity of studies indicate that consumers are willing to spend more 
when they perceive that a percentage of the price that they pay will be a charitable donation. 
Managers of for-profit organizations employing such strategies may consider the effect of 
psychological distance existent between their consumers and recipients of their charity. Based 
on the findings of the research contained in this dissertation they may adjust their 
communication strategy so as to enhance the quantum of charitable donations that consumers 
may be willing to pay and consequently their willingness to pay higher prices.  
To conclude, this dissertation contributes to the theorizing about charitable fundraising 
and affords the practitioner with actionable insights to increase the funds raised. It‟s primary 
contribution is the relation of psychological distance to charitable donations. In the first 
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essay, social distance interacts with consumers‟ use of affect vs. cognition to determine 
charitable donations and in the second essay, the three other types of psychological distance 







Key to Interpretation of Figures
(from bottom to top)
Social distance t (1, 45) = -2.19, p = 0.033
Affect vs. cognition t (1, 45) = -2.09, p = 0.042 (H1)
Interaction t (1, 45) =  1.94, p = 0.06 (H2)
Regression results: 
(i)   Contrast code for Distance: 
1 for closer, -1 for farther
(ii)  Moderator treated as
continuous
(iii)  Interaction term is 
multiplication of previous
Graph only for illustration
Median split applied to 
continuous moderator to 
yield 2 x 2 comparisons
n.s. p = 0.006
Probabilities are for 
regression of continuous 
moderator with DV after 
blocking each treatment
 
Figure 10 Key to Interpretation of Figures 
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